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EXPLAINING COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW:
THE STANDING OF POSITIVE POLITICAL THEORY
Benjamin Minhao Chen† & Zhiyu Li†
Abstract: The principal-agent model of administrative law sees bureaucrats as
imperfectly supervised agents of their political principals and courts as a tool used by the
latter to monitor and check the former. This paper compares how the class of plaintiffs
authorized to bring suit against governmental bodies has been defined in three countries
where one should expect to find significant barriers to administrative litigation—Japan,
Singapore, and the People’s Republic of China. Although these three Asian countries
have traditionally been one-party dominated states, we do observe substantial differences
in how legislatures and courts have addressed the issue of standing over time. It is
possible to explain these variations by examining three factors. First, the local
governments are, in some countries, sub-entities or agents of the national government.
Thus, administrative law might be used to regulate the acts of local governments in
addition to agencies, leading to broader notions of standing. Second, the level of political
competition could influence the doctrine of standing by incentivizing political
incumbents to secure alternative avenues for challenging the policies of their successors.
Third, the legal process is not the only mechanism available for monitoring the behavior
of agents. For example, the Administrative Management Agency, xinfang system, and
“Meet the People Sessions” offer channels for non-judicial resolution of administrative
disputes in Japan, China, and Singapore respectively. Yet courts and other monitoring
mechanisms are not perfect substitutes; the different quality and quantity of the
information collected, the creation of legal rules binding future decisions, and transaction
costs of overriding judicial outcomes distinguish between them. This last factor is, in
general, not easily resolved in one direction or another. The larger conclusion drawn is
that Positive Political Theory, while insightful, may not always give an elegant structure
to comparative studies in administrative law.

I.

INTRODUCTION

Does Positive Political Theory (PPT) explain doctrinal developments
in administrative law? This perspective on administrative law, also referred
to as “rational choice”1 or “political economy,”2 challenges the conventional
emphasis in legal scholarship on the values of procedural and administrative
†
Ph.D. student in Jurisprudence and Social Policy; University of California Berkeley School of
Law, benched@berkeley.edu.
†
J.S.D. candidate, University of California Berkeley School of Law; lizhiyu@berkeley.edu. This
paper benefitted from the comments of Robert Cooter, Lowell Dittmer, Robert A. Kagan, Hua Lin, Laurent
Mayali, Martin Shapiro, Rachel Stern, and Shangdong Yang, as well as audiences at the 52nd Annual
Meeting of the Public Choice Conference and the Younger Comparativists Committee of the American
Society of Comparative Law 4th Annual Global Conference.
1
See, e.g., Linda Cohen & Matthew L. Spitzer, Judicial Deference to Agency Action: A Rational
Choice and an Empirical Test, 69 S. CAL. L. REV. 431 (1996).
2
See, e.g., Nuno Garoupa, & Jud Mathews, Strategic Delegation, Discretion, and Deference:
Explaining the Comparative Law of Administrative Review, 62 AM. J. COMP. L. 1 (2014) [hereinafter
Garoupa & Mathews].

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

88

VOL. 25 NO. 1

fairness.3 It does so by characterizing legislative and judicial outcomes as
the product of choices by individual or group actors seeking to maximize
their interests in a strategic environment. In recent years, however, the PPT
account of administrative law in the United States has been called into
question by its performance in comparative contexts. After a review of the
relevant law in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and Germany,
some scholars, such as M. Elizabeth Magill and Daniel Ortiz, have
concluded that “something other than constitutional design best explains the
existence and shape of judicial review of administrative action”—judicial
culture. 4 In contrast, other scholars, such as Nuno Garoupa and Jud
Mathews, have presented a model that takes into account the relative control
that politicians have over government bureaucracy and courts.5 By factoring
in judicial autonomy, their model “explain[s] differences within legal
families in a way that previous political economy models could not.”6 In
particular, they argue that differences between American, British, French,
and German administrative law conform to PPT predictions.
But administrative law is not applied exclusively to agencies. It may
sometimes be used to contest the decisions of local governments. In
addition, courts are not the only means for legislatures to ensure that their
instructions are being faithfully executed. For example, legislatures have
instituted ombudsman offices as another tool used to monitor compliance
and rein in agency discretion. 7 These institutional details influence the
development of administrative law and should be included in a PPT
framework. To illustrate this, this paper will explore the elements required
for plaintiffs to have standing to initiate judicial review of administrative
action in three jurisdictions: Japan, Singapore, and the People’s Republic of
China (China).

3

See, e.g., M. Elizabeth Magill & Daniel R. Ortiz, Comparative Positive Political Theory, in
COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 134, 134 (Susan Rose-Akerman & Peter L. Lindseth eds., 2011)
(stating that “[l]ittle in the last thirty years has so changed thinking about American administrative law as
Positive Political Theory (PPT)”) [hereinafter Magill & Ortiz].
4
Id. at 145.
5
See generally Garoupa & Mathews, supra note 2.
6
Id. at 31.
7
The ombudsman is a governmental office that investigates public complaints of administrative
abuse or inefficiency. It does not exercise a judicial function and instead resolves disputes through
recommendations and/or mediation. In the United Kingdom, for example, both the findings and the
recommendations of Ombudsmen are non-binding on the government. See generally Bradley v. Work and
Pensions Secretary [2008] EWCA (Civ) 36 (Eng.). But the Ombudsman may bring to the attention of
Parliament instances of maladministration or injustice in the form of special reports. See Parliamentary
Commissioner Act 1967 (Eng.).
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There are several considerations informing the selection of our case
studies. First, while Magill and Ortiz limit their attention to judicial review
for administrative reasonableness, this article focuses on standing. This is
because narrow standing restricts the use of courts as an avenue for
politically marginalized interests that seek to challenge official policy. The
legal obstacle posed by standing also chills the interpretative development of
the law by judicial actors. If the judge who decides a case thereby
participates in the “authoritative reconstruction of the law-maker’s law,”8
preventing administrative disputes from being heard reduces the extent to
which the judiciary shares in the legislature’s power.9
Second, these three countries are, or were for a major part of their
recent history, stable, party-dominated states.10 It is therefore unlikely that
electoral competition explains disparities between Chinese and Singaporean
administrative law. On the other hand, the relatively recent emergence of
political turnover in Japan provides a source of variation that is both relevant
and interesting for PPT analysis.
Third, citizens in these three countries share similar cultural attitudes
towards litigation. There is a substantial body of scholarship that suggests
that the Japanese cherish harmony and prefer informal mechanisms of
dispute resolution over formal, adversarial procedures. 11 Under the
influence of Confucianism, the Chinese have traditionally preferred to settle
disputes in private rather than in a courtroom. 12 In Singapore, the
8
MARTIN SHAPIRO & ALEC STONE SWEET, ON LAW, POLITICS AND JUDICIALIZATION 69 (2002).
This would seem to be true only of common law countries, but judicial lawmaking has been taking place in
civil law countries as well. See, e.g., Edward A. Tomlinson, Tort Liability in France For the Act of Things:
A Study of Judicial Lawmaking, 48 LA. L. REV. 1299 (1988).
9
This is not to say that courts may not find a way around the obstacle. See Manoj Mate, Public
Interest Litigation and the Transformation of the Supreme Court of India, in CONSEQUENTIAL COURTS:
JUDICIAL ROLES IN GLOBAL PERSPECTIVE 262, 272 (Diana Kapiszewski, Gordon Silverstein, & Robert A.
Kagan eds., 2013) (“The Court’s decision in the Judges’ Case was thus a classic Marbury move: the Court
expanded its own jurisdiction by endorsing standing for [public interest litigation], but gave the government
what it wanted by deferring to the supremacy of the Executive in transfers and appointments.”) (emphasis
added).
10
The Liberal Democratic Party (LDP) has governed Japan from 1955 to the present, except for brief
interruptions between 1993 and 1994 and between 2009 and 2012. The Chinese Communist Party (CCP)
has ruled China since 1949. In Singapore, the People’s Action Party (PAP) has been in power since
independence from Malaysia in 1965.
11
See, e.g., Takeyoshi Kawashima, Dispute Resolution in Contemporary Japan, in LAW IN JAPAN:
THE LEGAL ORDER IN A CHANGING SOCIETY 41, 44 (Arthur von Mehren ed., 1963). Kawashima asserts
that the social rules of respectful obedience or kyǀjun and authority or ken-i undergird most relationships in
Japan. Hence, resorting to law is incompatible with the implied hierarchy of Japanese society.
12
See Lester Ross, Changing Profile of Dispute Resolution in Rural China: The Case of Zouping
County, Shandong, 26 STAN. J. INT'L L. 15, 16 (1989).
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government has articulated an ideology that legal scholar Eugene Tan has
summarized as “civility over contentiousness,” and “responsibilities over
rights.”13 Thus, our comparative analysis controls for legal consciousness as
a significant explanatory factor.
In dominant-party states where control of the legislative chamber
coincides with the exercise of executive power, one should find that the
judiciary has a marginal role to play in policing the conduct of
administrative agencies. Thus, one should also expect the class of persons
permitted to sue for relief in administrative cases to be carefully
circumscribed. Yet, the law of standing has diverged in these three
jurisdictions. By attempting to explain these and other differences, this
paper hopes to demonstrate both the extent and the limits of PPT as a model
for understanding administrative law.
Section II offers a quick primer on the principal-agent model that is at
the core of PPT. The goal is not to conduct an exhaustive survey but to
introduce the type of reasoning that has been applied in recent work on
comparative administrative law. Section III summarizes some of the
jurisdictional elements for judicial review of administrative action in each of
the three countries through a review of statutory and case law. Section IV
compares the variation and evolution in standing doctrines and analyzes
them through the PPT framework. Section V discusses the range of
institutional designs that the legislature could use to monitor and discipline
those to whom it has delegated policymaking functions.
II.

THE PRINCIPAL-AGENT MODEL

The classic principal-agent paradigm posits bureaucrats as servants of
the legislature tasked with implementing the legislative intent as expressed
through statutes.14 Its “central premise” is that “bureaucratic institutions and
legislative-bureaucratic interaction . . . [should be interpreted] as promoting
the interests of the principal to the greatest extent possible.” 15 The
13
Eugene Tan KB, Harmony as Ideology, Culture, and Control: Alternative Dispute Resolution in
Singapore, 9 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 120 (2007). The 1991 White Paper distinguished between “Asian
societies” that “emphasize the interests of the community” and “Western societies” that “stress the rights of
the individual.” For Singapore, “an emphasis on the interests of the community” is a “key survival value”
to be “preserve[d]” and “strengthen[ed].”
14
See, e.g., Sean Gailmard, Accountability and Principal-Agent Theory, in THE OXFORD HANDBOOK
OF PUBLIC ACCOUNTABILITY 90, 95 (Mark Bovens, et al., eds., 2014) (“One of the earliest, and still most
robust, principal-agent literatures in political science takes bureaucrats as agents of some constellations of
political principals – most often Congress, the president or executive actors, and/or courts.”).
15
Id. at 96.
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legislature might prescribe a mission for an agency without specifying in
detail how it is to be accomplished or the rules that have to be followed in
reaching a determination. In such situations, the legislature delegates broad
authority to the agency. Alternatively, the legislature might seek to
constrain agency discretion either by narrowly defining the scope of its
mandate or by setting up procedural requirements such as notice-andcomment or cost-benefit analysis. The choice is influenced by, among other
things, the level of trust in the bureaucratic agent, in particular whether the
agent will faithfully apply his or her expertise to respond to unique
circumstances rather than pursue his or her own political agenda and
preferences.16 It is also shaped by the possibility of monitoring the agent
and correcting his or her excesses.
Not always having the resources to monitor the activities of the
bureaucracy, legislatures often empower judicial actors to supervise agency
activity in a number of ways. For example, legislatures sometimes grant
courts the authority to review administrative decisions. In addition,
legislatures can create a private right of action, allowing private citizens and
interest groups to check agencies that might otherwise be tempted to stray
from legislative preferences.17 In doing so, the legislature uses judges not as
policemen who actively “patrol” for infractions, but as “fire alarms” that
attract the attention of lawmakers to ongoing violations. 18 In addition,
legislators themselves may look to courts as an instrument for preserving
their political gains after they leave office.19 In the context of the United
States, for example, Mathew McCubbins, et al., argue that “the primary
explanation for the failure of administrative reform proposals before World
War II but their success later was the desire of New Democrats to ‘hard wire’
the policies of the New Deal against an expected Republican, anti-New Deal
political tide in the late 1940s.”20 If true, the Congressional supporters of the
16

See, e.g., Robert A. Kagan, The Organization of Administrative Justice Systems: The Role of
Political Mistrust, in ADMINISTRATIVE JUSTICE IN CONTEXT 161, 162 (Michael Adler ed., 2010). The
delegation of policy-making authority to agents may also be necessary to incentivize them to acquire taskspecific expertise. See SEAN GAILMARD & JOHN W. PATTY, LEARNING WHILE GOVERNING 25 (Benjamin I.
Page et al. eds., 2013).
17
Mathew D. McCubbins et al., Administrative Procedures as Instruments of Political Control, 3 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 243 (1998).
18
See Mathew D. McCubbins & Thomas Schwartz, Congressional Oversight Overlooked: Police
Patrols versus Fire Alarms, 28 AM. J. POL. SCI. 165, 165–166 (1984) [hereinafter McCubbins & Schwartz].
19
See, e.g., William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Independent Judiciary in an Interest
Group Perspective, 18 J.L. & ECON. 875, 878 (1975); Robert Cooter & Tom Ginsburg, Comparative
Judicial Discretion: An Empirical Test of Economic Models, 16 INT’L REV. L. & ECON. 295, 297 (1996).
20
Mathew D. McCubbins et al., The Political Origins of the Administrative Procedure Act, 15 J.L.
ECON. & ORG. 180, 180 (1999).
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New Deal did not promulgate administrative procedure to realize the ideal of
due process that had hitherto been pursued in an uneven fashion by courts.
Rather, they acted to create a forum for scrutinizing agency conduct if and
when they came under the command of a politically unfriendly President.
Recent scholarship has emphasized the relevance of political structure
for understanding comparative administrative law. Consider the following
spatial model of agency regulation under a parliamentary system.21
Figure 1

The line above represents a one-dimensional policy space. Pparliament is the
legislature’s ideal. The agency starts by making a policy that is observed by
all actors. The legislature may then choose to override the agency, but this
involves transaction costs. If the agency selects either Plower or Pupper, the
legislature is indifferent between overruling and sustaining the agency’s
action. Under this set-up, the agency has discretion to select any policy
between Plower and Pupper. This is because the legislature finds the benefits of
revising any policy in that interval to be smaller than the costs. Hence, in
equilibrium, the agency selects Plower and the legislature allows Plower to stand.
In contrast, under a presidential system, both the legislature and the
executive have to agree to reverse an agency’s policy.

21

See, e.g., ROBERT COOTER, THE STRATEGIC CONSTITUTION 154 (2000).
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Figure 2

The agency has greater discretion since it is able to select a policy from a
larger interval, [Pl, lower, Pe, upper].22 Magill and Ortiz, therefore, argue that if
PPT holds, judicial review should “be much more limited in domain and less
searching in application in a parliamentary than in a presidential system.”23
They find, however, that this is not borne out by a comparison of
reasonableness review in the United States, United Kingdom, France, and
Germany. The alternative, they suggest, is the “traditional explanation that
administrative law scholars give for the existence and shape of judicial
review of administrative action: judicial cultures.”24
Because judges reviewing agency behavior are themselves agents,
political principals must balance the authority delegated to agencies against
the discretion exercised by courts.25 Garoupa and Mathews develop this idea
by elaborating a typology consisting, on the one hand, of low or high
autonomy agencies and, on the other hand, of low or high autonomy
courts.26 According to this model, agencies are considered “low autonomy”
if they operate in a parliamentary system or under a unitary form of
government and “high autonomy” if they operate in a presidential system or
22
To see that this is true, notice that if the agency promulgates a policy between Pl, lower and Pe, lower,
only the executive, not the legislature, has an incentive to initiate change.
23
Magill & Ortiz, supra note 3, at 138.
24
Id. at 145.
25
See, e.g., Thomas W. Merrill, Faithful Agent, Integrative, and Welfarist Interpretation, LEWIS &
CLARK L. REV. 1565, 1567 (2010) (“Faithful agent theories adopt a principal-agent model of [statutory]
interpretation. The interpreter is cast in the role of subordinate agent, seeking in good faith to carry out the
instructions of the lawmaker, who is understood to be the principal.” (citation omitted)).
26
Garoupa & Mathews, supra note 2, at 13.
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under a federal form of government, while courts are considered “low
autonomy” if they are specialized or if there is a career judiciary and “high
autonomy” if they are generalist or if there is a recognition judiciary. The
conclusions of a game-theoretic analysis of the interaction between these
types are reproduced and summarized in the following figure.27
Table 1

¾
¾
Low autonomy

¾
¾

Courts

¾
¾
High autonomy

¾
¾

Agencies
Low autonomy
High autonomy
Broad delegation
¾ Broad delegation
Narrow scope for judicial
¾ Broad scope for judicial
review
review
Application of expertise by ¾ Application of expertise by
agencies
agencies
Judicial review plays
¾ Judicial review plays
marginal role
important role
¾ Mixed strategies
Broad delegation
¾ Broad and narrow
Narrow scope for judicial
delegations
review
¾ Agencies sometimes apply
Application of expertise by
expertise and sometimes
agencies
play safe
Courts push to expand role ¾ Courts sometimes review
of judicial review.
aggressively and sometimes
defer to agency.

While the party-dominated states that we have selected do not hew
exactly to any of these ideal types, they could, on first pass, be placed in the
quadrant of low autonomy agencies and low autonomy courts. Hence, one
should anticipate a narrow scope of judicial review and, in particular, limited
standing.28 We now turn to the law in these countries.
III.

STANDING TO SUE IN JAPAN, SINGAPORE, AND CHINA

A.

Japan

The Administrative Case Litigation Law (ACLL) of 1962 provides for
four types of named suits. The first is “direct attack suits,” or kǀkoku soshǀ,
which encompasses “lawsuits of grievance relating to the exercise of public
power by an administrative agency.”29 The second is defined as “party suits,”
27

Id. at 14, 17, 21, 24, 28.
Id. at 17.
29
John O. Haley, Japanese Administrative Law, in JAPANESE LAW: READINGS IN THE POLITICAL
ECONOMY OF JAPANESE LAW 301, 307 (J. Mark Ramseyer ed., 2001) (citation omitted).
28

JANUARY 2016

EXPLAINING COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

95

or tǀjisha soshǀ, in which administrative actions are challenged collaterally
in a civil suit.30 The third is labeled “public suits,” or minshǌ soshǀ.31 These
are corrective actions that may be “instituted by persons qualified to vote
without having the qualifications of having any other legal interest.” 32
However, such suits must be explicitly provided for by statute.33 The fourth
type of suit is “agency suits,” or kikan soshǀ, used to resolve jurisdictional
disputes between governmental bodies.34
The decision of a public authority is typically challenged through the
kǀkoku soshǀ, which has a number of procedural standing requirements.
Critically, the plaintiff must suffer an injury to his legal interest; an injuryin-fact is not sufficient for standing.35 A legal interest is usually “created by
provisions vesting an administrative agency with the duty of protecting some
personal interest.”36 The Bathhouse Case is frequently cited as a judicial
explanation of this definition. 37 The suit was brought by a bathhouse to
contest the issuance of a license to a competitor. Bathhouses were licensed
subject to the condition that they be located at least 250 meters apart from
each other. 38 This restriction was officially justified on public health
30

Id.
Id.
32
Id.
33
One example is a residents’ suit, which targets financial irregularity or irresponsibility in local
governments. Any registered resident of a prefecture, city, town, or village may sue for illegally expended
money to be returned by the defendant to the relevant public entity. Between 1983 and 1987, there were 42
such suits filed against prefectural governments and up to 250 against municipalities. See Takehisa
Nakagawa, Participatory Administrative Law (unpublished manuscript), http://www.sota.j.utokyo.ac.jp/info/Papers/nakagawa.pdf.
34
See Gyǀsei jiken sosho ho [Administrative Case Litigation Law], Law No. 139 of 1962, translated
in 2 EHS LAW BULL. SER. No. 2391 (1989), at 21, http://www.refworld.org/docid/3fbe13c1a.html
[hereinafter ACLL]; see also Haley, supra note 29, at 307–308.
35
“Suits for revocation of a disposition and decision (hereinafter referred to as “revocation
litigation”) may be filed only by persons having legal interests for seeking the revocation of the said
disposition or decision (including persons having legal interests to be recovered by the revocation of a
disposition or decision even after the effect of the disposition or decision no longer exists due to the
expiration of the period or any other reason).” ACLL, supra note 34, at Art. 9. “In a revocation litigation,
no person shall seek a revocation on the grounds of illegality not concerned with his legal interest.” Id. at
Art. 10.
36
Ichiro Ogawa, Judicial Review of Administrative Actions in Japan, 43 WASH. L. REV. 1075, 1087
(1968). See also Masashi Kaneko, Les Juges et les Grands Choix Politiques et Administratifs de l’Etat en
Droit Administratif Japonais, in ETUDES DE DROIT JAPONAIS 380 (Société de Législation Comparée, 1989)
and MARK J. RAMSEYER & MINORU NAKAZATO, JAPANESE LAW: AN ECONOMIC APPROACH 199–201
(1999).
37
Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 26, 1955, 9 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHǋ [KEISHǋ] 89
(Japan), translated in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 293 (1964). See also Ichiro
Ogawa, supra note 36, at 1087–88 n.45; HIDEO TANAKA, THE JAPANESE LEGAL SYSTEM 689–92 (1978);
CARL F. GOODMAN, THE RULE OF LAW IN JAPAN: A COMPARATIVE ANALYSIS 509 (2012).
38
Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Jan. 26, 1955, 9 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO KEIJI HANREISHǋ [KEISHǋ] 89,
translated in JOHN M. MAKI, COURT AND CONSTITUTION IN JAPAN 294–95 (1964).
31
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grounds.39 The court found, however, that the constraint was also “intended
to prevent undue competition among public bathhouse proprietors” and that
a “plaintiff’s business interest should be considered protected by lawful
operation of the licensing system.”40 Therefore, “he may well have standing
to ask for the annulment of a third party’s license, because his interest is not
a mere reflex, but rather a legal interest . . . .”41
A dispute concerning the construction of a shopping center in Etsurigo
Village also serves to illustrate the concept of “legal interest.” The Diet
passed the Large Scale Retail Stores Law in 1973, superseding the
Department Store Law of 1937. 42 Under the previous regulatory regime,
department stores could not engage in any business unless they obtained
prior administrative clearance.43 The 1973 law eliminated the registration
requirement, but required entrants to keep the Ministry of International
Trade and Industry appraised of any proposed activity.44 Furthermore, the
Ministry could require the entrant to negotiate with existing merchants in the
area over the terms under which the latter would agree to the opening of a
new store. 45 In January 1981, 117 local merchants petitioned for
nullification of the Ministry’s recommendation of a plan submitted by the
Etsurigo Shopping Centre Cooperative Co. and revised by the Tohoku Large
Stores Council. The plaintiffs alleged conflicts of interest and procedural
irregularities,46 but their contentions were summarily rebuffed. 47 The court
ruled inter alia that the mention of “enterprise opportunities” in Article 1 of
the Large Scale Retail Stores Law did not give rise to anything more than a
“reflex” interest on the part of existing businesses.48

39

Ichiro Ogawa, supra note 36, at 1088 n.45.
Id.
41
Id.; see also RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 36, at 200–01.
42
Frank K. Upham, Privatized Regulation: Japanese Regulatory Style in Comparative and
International Perspective, 20 FORDHAM INT'L L.J. 396, 404–05 (1996).
43
Id. at 405.
44
Id.
45
Id. See also Jean Heilman Grier, Japan's Regulation of Large Retail Stores: Political Demands
Versus Economic Interests, 22 U. PA. J. INT'L ECON. L. 1 (2001).
46
Upham, supra note 42, at 411 (“Specifically, the local merchants alleged that President Takahashi
of the Etsurigo Chamber of Commerce, whose son was the president of the Etsurigo Shopping Center
Cooperative, had a direct conflict of interest and had selected members of the Adjustment Board solely on
the basis of their pro-shopping center views.”).
47
Id. at 415 (“Had consumers been suing MITI on the ground that the 6.390 square meters allotted to
Jusco in the recommendation was too small to serve their interests, the result would have been the same. . . .
[T]he only potential plaintiff . . . would be a prospective large retailer dissatisfied with the amount of space
given him through the adjustment process.”).
48
Id.
40
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In a more recent example, the Japanese Supreme Court held that
residents whose persons and property would be threatened in the event of a
natural disaster had standing to challenge the approval of the construction of
six golf courses upstream of the River Ozato.49 The justices were persuaded
that the provisions of Article 10-2 of the Forestry Law “should be construed
to aim not only at the ensurance [sic] of the public interest function of the
forest . . . [but also] the protection of the safety of the life and health of the
inhabitants living within a certain range of areas adjacent to the area to be
developed as a specific interest of the individuals.”50
Intimately tied to the question of standing is the doctrine of shobunsei,
sometimes translated as “ripeness” 51 or “in the nature of a disposition.”52
Article 3 of the Administrative Case Litigation Law defines kǀkoku soshǀ as
“a litigation of dissatisfaction relating to the exercise of public power by an
administrative agency.”53 For a kǀkoku soshǀ to go forward there must first
be a shobun.54 As articulated by the Supreme Court of Japan in 1955, a
shobun is an “official action which forms the rights and duties of the citizens
or confirms the scope thereof.”55 In that case, a notice from the Atami City
Agricultural Council to a farmer regarding the boundaries of the latter’s land
was found not to be a shobun because it had no legal effect and was not
adverse to the farmer’s property rights. 56 The lesson drawn is that
“supervisory orders, permissions, approvals, and regulations among agencies
or within a single agency cannot be the object of litigation.”57
Prior to the enactment of the ACLL in 1962, it was generally
understood that plaintiffs could not file a “preventive” suit.58 While many
hoped that the ACLL would lead to a broader notion of shobun, subsequent
developments indicated that the traditional understanding had not been
displaced. The outcome of Edogawa Ward v. Minister of Transportation is
especially instructive in this regard. 59 In 1972, the Minister of
49
Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Mar. 13, 2001, 55 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 283,
http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2001.03.13-1996.-Gyo-Tsu-.No.180.html.
50
Id.
51
See e.g. RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 36, at 196.
52
Robert W. Dziubla, The Impotent Sword of Japanese Justice: The Doctrine of Shobunsei as a
Barrier to Administrative Litigation, 18 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 37, 38 (1985).
53
ACLL, supra note 34, at Art. 3.
54
Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 24, 1995, 9 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 217.
55
Id.
56
Id.; see also Dziubla, supra note 52, at 45.
57
Dziubla, supra note 52, at 53.
58
Ichiro Ogawa, supra note 36, at 1083.
59
Tokyo Kǀtǀ Saibansho [Tokyo High Ct.] Oct. 24, 1973, 722 HANREI JIHƿ 52.
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Transportation published plans for a railway line linking Tokyo to Narita
and signed off on its construction by the contractor, Japan Railway
Construction Corporation. Residents within a designated area of 200 meters
from the proposed tracks sought judicial relief. The Tokyo High Court
dismissed the claim:
At the stage of the approval of a Construction Implementation
Plan, it has not necessarily been concretely confirmed who will
in the future become an interested party when the Plan is
executed. In that sense, a Construction Implementation Plan
and its official approval must be considered as abstract in nature.
In other words, that approval is unlike a concrete disposition
directed at a specified individual. Furthermore, there is no
provision that requires its publication, and it itself has no effect
whatsoever on citizens’ rights and duties.60
The implication is that any potential claim must be deferred pending actual
implementation of the policy. 61 However, this means that sunk costs and
irreversibility of damage could eventually militate against judicial
invalidation of the administrative act.62
Restrictive construction of shobun also facilitates the use of
administrative guidance, a form of regulation whereby an authority invites
the relevant parties to voluntarily adhere to its guidelines.63 As the advice
has no legal effect until it is actually enforced, it has historically not been
considered a reviewable action. For example, in Okamura v. Japan, the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs requested that 345 political activists not apply

60
Frank K. Upham, After Minamata: Current Prospects and Problems in Japanese Environmental
Litigation, 8 ECOLOGY L.Q. 213, 237 (1979).
61
See, e.g., id. at 238; Dziubla, supra note 52, at 47; GOODMAN, supra note 37, at 514.
62
See, e.g., Sapporo Chiho Saibansho [Sapporo Dist. Ct.] Mar 27, 1997, 1598 HANREI JIHƿ 33, 39
(Japan), translated in 38 INT’L LEGAL MATERIALS 397, 428-29 (1999). (“Nibutani dam has already been
completed with an enormous expenditure of tens of billions of yen and is filling with water… we are [thus]
forced to recognize the extraordinary harm to the public interest that would arise from reversing the
Confiscatory Administrative Rulings. Additionally, we find that the Poromoy Chashi has already been
destroyed and the Pe-ure-pukka and Kankanrerekehe Chinomishir have each been demolished by the dam
construction. Even if the Confiscatory Administrative Rulings are reversed, these sites cannot be
restored.”). The expropriation of Ainu lands was declared illegal but the dam was permitted to continue
operation.
63
See generally Michael K. Young, Judicial Review of Administrative Guidance: Governmentally
Encouraged Consensual Dispute Resolution in Japan, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 923 (1984); Takehisa Nakagawa,
Administrative Informality in Japan: Governmental Activities Outside Statutory Authorization, 52 ADMIN.
L. REV. 175 (2000).
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for passports to attend a festival in Moscow. 64 This request was not
considered to be a reviewable disposition. 65 Since there was no formal
application, there could not have been any refusal, and hence shobun, by the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs. While it is natural that consent should act as a
bar to remedy, informality can take on coercive overtones when the time
horizon of interactions is long and the powers of the governmental agency
are broad.66
Despite traditionally narrow rules of standing and shobun, judicial
interpretations and legislative reforms have gradually opened the door to a
more generous application of these principles. In 2001, the Justice System
Reform Council expressed a vision: to “transform the excessive advancecontrol/adjustment type society to an after-the-fact review/remedy type
society.”67 Amendments to the ACLL in 2004 codified evolving case law,68
and provide for standing if the plaintiff has a right protected by a statute or
ordinance that is relevant to the administrative action being reviewed.69 This
shift is exemplified by Izuka v. Director of Kanto Regional Development
Bureau (“Odakyǌ Railroad Case”). 70 There, the Supreme Court of Japan
partially reversed the judgment of the lower court, ruling that residents
64
Tokyo Kǀtǀ Saibansho [Tokyo App. Ct.] 1962, 8 SHƿMU GEPPƿ 1836 (Japan). See also Young,
supra note 63, at 954.
65
Tokyo Kǀtǀ Saibansho [Tokyo App. Ct.] 1962, 8 SHƿMU GEPPƿ 1836 (Japan). See also Young,
supra note 63, at 954.
66
See Takehisa Nakagawa, supra note 63 (explaining that the concept of informality in the United
States refers to the absence of either concrete rules or adversarial procedures whereas informality in the
Japanese context implicates either extra-statutory policy-making or the employment of extra-statutory
methods).
67
Recommendations of the Justice System Reform Council, JUSTICE SYSTEM REFORM COUNCIL (June
12, 2001), http://www.kantei.go.jp/foreign/policy/sihou/singikai/990612_e.html.
68
Saikǀ Saibancho [Sup. Ct.] Feb. 17, 1989, 43 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 56,
translated in 10 WASEDA BULL. COMP. L. 36, http://www.waseda.jp/hiken/jp/public/bulletin/pdf/10/ronbu
n/A02859211-00-000100036.pdf; Nagoya Kǀtǀ Saibansho [Nagoya High Ct.] Jan. 27, 2003, 1818 HANREI
JIHO
3,
translated
in
23
WASEDA
BULL.
COMP.
L.
67
(2003)
http://www.waseda.jp/hiken/jp/public/bulletin/pdf/23/ronbun/A02859211-00-000230067.pdf); see also
HITOSHI USHIJIMA, Administrative Law and Judicialized Governance in Japan, in ADMINISTRATIVE LAW
AND GOVERNANCE IN ASIA: COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVES 93 (Tom Ginsburg & Albert H.Y. Chen eds.,
2009); GOODMAN, supra note 37, at 511; Narufumi Kadomatsu, Judicial Governance Through Resolution
of Legal Disputes - A Japanese Perspective, 4 NAT’L TAIWAN U. L. REV. 41, 156 (2009).
69
Gyǀsei jiken Soshǀhǀ No Ichibu Wo Kaiseisuru Hǀritsu [Act for Partial Revision of the
Administrative Case Litigation Law], Law No. 84 of 2004 (Japan) (“[T]he court shall also make reference
to the purport and purpose of any relevant laws and regulations that share the purpose with the governing
laws and regulations, and when considering the contents and nature of the interest, the court shall take into
account the contents and nature of the interest that is likely to be injured if the disposition is made in
violation of the governing laws and regulations as well as how and to what extent that it is likely to be
injured.”).
70
See Yuichiro Tsuji, The Legal Issues on Environmental Administrative Lawsuits Under the
Amendment of ACLA in Japan, 1 YONSEI L.J. 339, 354 (2010).
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whose property would not be directly affected by an approved over-ground
rail line were nevertheless eligible to sue because they had a protected legal
interest.71 Their legal interest issued from city ordinances that were enacted
to safeguard the welfare of neighboring residents, in particular from damage
to their health and living environment from noise and vibration. 72 The
doctrine of legal interest was further elaborated in a 2008 decision,
Nakamura v. Hamamatsu City.73 In that case, the court reasoned that the
promulgation of a plan for land readjustment immediately foreclosed the
options of individual landowners. 74 It became “necessary to obtain
permission from the prefectural governor in order to carry out, within the
implementation zone, activities such as changing the shape or nature of the
land or constructing, remodeling or extending buildings or other structures,
which are likely to hinder the implementation of the land readjustment
project . . . .”75 The effect was therefore not “general or abstract.”76
The definition of a shobun has also been interpreted more broadly by
Japanese courts. In Nakamura, the Grand Bench recognized that any
revocation of the disposition of land substitution at a later stage “would
cause serious confusion to the project as a whole” and be injurious to the
public interest.77 It therefore announced that “it is reasonable to allow the
filing of a suit to seek revocation of a decision to adopt a project plan at the
stage when the decision is made.”78 Further, in a 2004 case, the Supreme
Court held that a written notice of violation served on an importer by the
director of the quarantine station was a shobun. 79 The judgment of the
Tokyo High Court, finding the notification to be “practical guidance” to the
appellant and not legally binding on the Director-General of Customs, was

71

Id.
Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Dec. 7, 2005, 2004 (Gyo-Hi) no. 114, 59 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 2645, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2005.12.07-2004.-Gyo-Hi.No..114.html. See also GOODMAN, supra note 37, at 511–12; Narufumi Kadomatsu, supra note 68, at 158
(describing it as the “leading case on the interpretation of the newly inserted Paragraph 2 of Article 9 of the
ACLA”).
73
Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Sept. 10, 2008, 2005 (Gyo-Hi) no. 397, 62 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 2029, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2008.09.10-2005.-Gyo-Hi.No..397.html.
74
Id.
75
Id.
76
Id.
77
Id.
78
Id.
79
Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] Apr. 26, 2004, 2003 (Gyo-Hi) no. 206, 58 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI
HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 989, http://www.courts.go.jp/english/judgments/text/2004.04.26-2003-Gyo-HiNo..206.html.
72
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quashed. 80 The next year, the Supreme Court of Japan heard Takano v.
Governor of Toyama, an appeal from the Nagoya High Court. 81 The
plaintiff in Takano had declined a “recommendation” made under the
Medical Service Law. 82 The 1987 Notification from the Director of
Insurance Bureau had cautioned that:
If despite the recommendation made by the prefectural
governor under Article 30–7 of the Medical Service Law
because of particular necessity for facilitating the achievement
of the medical scheme, the hospital has been established and an
application has been filed for designation of the hospital as an
insurance medical institution, the hospital shall be regarded as
“extremely inappropriate” as provided in Article 43–3(2) of the
Health Insurance Law, and the prefectural governor shall
consult with the regional social insurance council for refusal to
grant designation.83
In light of the “considerable certainty” of the “consequences,” the
document sent to the applicant qualified as a disposition within the meaning
of Article 3(2) of the ACLL.84
Table 2: Summary of Japan
Interest

Action

Entity

Japan Pre-2004
Legal interest has to be expressly created
by governing statute that charges the
agency to protect some personal interest;
others as provided by statute (under
minshǌ soshǀ)
Existence of shobun, i.e. an official
action pertaining to rights and duties of
citizens; internal and inter-agency orders
and regulations not subject to suit; no
“preventive” suits; excludes
administrative guidance
Administrative agencies; local
governments (under minshǌ soshǀ)

Japan Post-2004
In determining legal interest, to also
consider “purport and purpose” of
relevant laws and regulations

Nakamura (reviewability of “preventive”
suits); Takano (reviewability of
administrative guidance if consequences
are “considerabl[y]” certain)

Administrative agencies; local
governments (under minshǌ soshǀ)

Between 1990 and 2007, there has been a gradual rise in the number of
80

Id.
Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 15, 2004, 59 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 1661,
http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=760.
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Id.
81
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administrative cases litigated before the courts.85 Yet, it was estimated in
1997 that approximately twenty-five percent of all such suits were still being
dismissed for lack of standing, or shobun. 86 Although there has been
movement in the direction of liberalization in the years leading up to 2004,
its impact on governance and regulation in Japan still awaits detailed study.
B.

Singapore

A colony of the British Empire from 1819 to 1963, the Singapore
legal system has traditionally been influenced by legal developments in
England. Of the 1,383 cases cited as authorities in the 527 decisions of the
High Court of Singapore reported between 1965 and 1985, 23.8% of them
were local, whereas 66.7% were English.87 It is therefore no surprise that
the framework for judicial review of administrative acts in Singapore is
similar to that of the United Kingdom. Indeed, in a lecture on the subject
delivered in 2010 to students at the Singapore Management University,
Chief Justice Chan Sek Keong commented that the “courts [of Singapore
and the U.K.] apply the same principles because we inherited the same
system of law.”88 The law of standing inherited from English law derives
from the rules of court that restrict standing to parties having a sufficient
interest and is reinforced by the common law distinction between private and
public law.89
The first hurdle to be cleared before a suit may proceed is that the
matter being contested has to be susceptible to review by the courts. 90
Amongst other things, the issue has to be one of public law. In Council of
Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, Lord Diplock
emphasized the importance of the source of the decision-making authority,
which “is nearly always nowadays a statute or subordinate legislation made

85

Narufumi Kadomatsu, supra note 68, at 147.
HIROYUKI HATA & GO NAKAGAWA, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW OF JAPAN 164 (1997).
Walter Woon, The Applicability of English Law in Singapore, in THE SINGAPORE LEGAL SYSTEM
230 (Kevin Y.L. Tan ed., 2d ed. 1999).
88
Chan Sek Keong, Judicial Review-From Angst to Empathy: A Lecture to Singapore Management
University Second Year Law Students, 22 SING. ACAD. L.J. 469, 473 (2010).
89
See H.W.R. WADE & C.F. FORSYTH, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW 562–63, 572–74, 582–83, 589–90
(10th ed. 2009).
90
Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General [2012] SGCH 210 (“Leave to apply for
prerogative orders will not be granted unless the court is satisfied as to the following: (a) The subject matter
of the complaint is susceptible to judicial review; (b) The material before the court discloses an arguable
case or a prima facie case of reasonable suspicion in favour of granting the remedies sought by the
applicant; and (c) The applicant has sufficient interest in the matter.”).
86
87

JANUARY 2016

EXPLAINING COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

103

under the statute.”91 A later judgment, rendered in R. v. Panel on Take-overs
and Mergers, ex parte Datafin plc, found the Panel on Take-overs and
Mergers, an unincorporated, informal, and self-regulating body, to be
nevertheless subject to judicial review.92 The critical factor there was the
nature of the power being exercised. By “devising, promulgating, amending
and interpreting the City Code on Take-overs and Mergers,” the Panel could
indirectly alter the legal status of persons.93 In the words of Lord Justice
Lloyd, “[i]t has a giant’s strength.”94 Thus, the Datafin test considers both
the source and the nature of the power being exercised. This precedent was
absorbed into Singapore law through Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee
Lin Linda95 and reaffirmed in UDL Marine (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Jurong
Town Corp.96 The former concerned the dismissal of an employee, while
the latter involved a lease renewal. In both cases, the court noted that the
action of the statutory agency, though ultimately having some basis in
statute, came under contract law. On the other hand, the public reprimand of
the director of a corporation listed on the Singapore Exchange, an
investment holding company, contained a public element and could
therefore be reviewed. 97 The court noted, among other things, that the
Singapore Exchange “is an approved exchange under [Section] 16 of the
[Securities and Futures Act]”98 and that “reprimand of directors of a listed
company by . . . a front-line securities regulator, carries financial and
business implications.”99 These facts made the reprimand power a public
function “susceptible to judicial review for minimum compliance with the
standards of ‘legality, rationality and procedural propriety.’”100
91

Council of Civil Service Unions v. Minister for the Civil Service, [1985] 1 AC 374 (HL) 409
(Lord Diplock) (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK)
92
R. v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, Ex Parte Datafin Plc, [1987] QB 815. (Eng.) [hereinafter
R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers); see also Thio Li-Ann, Law and the Administrative State, in THE
SINGAPORE LEGAL SYSTEM 160, 178 (Kevin Y.L. Tan ed., 2d ed. 1999).
93
See R v. Panel on Take-overs and Mergers, supra note 92 at 826.
94
Id. (Lord Lloyd) at 845.
95
Linda Lai Swee v. Public Service Commission [2000] SGHC 162 (although the court eventually
concluded that the dismissal of a Land Office employee was undertaken pursuant to contract, it recognized
the validity of the source test applied in Datafin).
96
UDL Marine (Singapore) Pte. Ltd. v. Jurong Town Corp. [2011] SGHC 45.
97
See Yeap Wai Kong v. Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Ltd, [2012] SGHC 103 [hereinafter
Yeap Wai Kong v. Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Ltd]; see also Manjit Singh s/o Kirpal Singh v.
Attorney-General, [2013] SGCA 22. The curious reader may wonder about the status of administrative
guidelines under Singapore law. See, e.g., Lines International Holding Pte Ltd v. Singapore Tourist
Promotion Board and Port of Singapore Authority, [1997] 2 SLR 584 (rejecting the argument that
guidelines have to be officially promulgated to be enforceable); Thio Li-Ann, supra note 92, at 172–173.
98
Yeap Wai Kong v. Singapore Exchange Securities Trading Ltd, supra note 97, at [21].
99
Id. at [25].
100
Id. at [28].
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The second obstacle is that the plaintiff must have a sufficient interest
in the case. Section 31(3) of the United Kingdom’s Senior Courts Act of
1981 provides that leave for judicial review shall not be granted unless “the
applicant has a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application
relates.”101 This rule was duly applied in the seminal case of R. v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners ex parte National Federation of Self-Employed and
Small Business Ltd.102 The plaintiff, an association of taxpayers, alleged that
the grant of amnesty to a group of casual employees was illegal. The Court
of Appeals discerned a “genuine grievance,” but the House of Lords
unanimously reversed. 103 In so doing, their Lordships articulated a twostage test.104 Leave would be refused at the first stage to “busybodies” who
possess no genuine interest whatsoever.105 To succeed at the second stage,
the applicant then has to demonstrate a strong case on the merits, balanced
by the degree of his or her concern.106 For Lord Scarman, the Federation
had failed to adduce any evidence for the breach of a statutory duty and
therefore lacked “sufficient interest.” 107 Lord Wilberforce, in particular,
asserted that “one taxpayer has no sufficient interest in asking the court to
investigate the tax affairs of another taxpayer or to complain that the latter
has been under-assessed.”108 In his view, “an aggregate of individuals each
of whom has no interest cannot of itself have an interest.”109 This narrow
reading drew a lament from Lord Diplock, who regretted the “grave lacuna”
in public law. 110 For him, “outdated technical rules” should not obstruct
“[vindication of] the rule of law.”111
The latter position has come to be embraced by English judges. In R.
v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, ex parte Smedley,112 a taxpayer was permitted to
101
See, e.g., WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 89, at 562. C.f. M.P. JAIN, ADMINISTRATIVE LAW OF
MALAYSIA AND SINGAPORE 513 (3d ed. 1989).
102
See R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex Parte National Federation of Self-employed and
Small Businesses Ltd., [1982] AC 617 (HL) (appeal taken from Eng.) (UK) [hereinafter R v. Inland
Revenue Commissioners].
103
R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, Ex Parte National Federation of Self-employed and Small
Businesses Ltd, [1980] QB 407, 425.
104
R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, supra note 102 (per Lord Wilberforce. Lords Diplock and
Scarman agreed. Lord Fraser disagreed.).
105
Id. at 646.
106
See WADE & FORSYTH, supra note 89, at 591. See also R v. Monopolies and Merger Commission
ex parte Argyll Group, [1986] 1 W.L.R. 763.
107
See R v. Inland Revenue Commissioners, supra note 102, at 653–55 (Lord Scarman).
108
Id. at 633 (Lord Wilberforce).
109
Id. (Lord Wilberforce).
110
Id. at 644 (Lord Diplock).
111
Id. (Lord Diplock).
112
R. v. Her Majesty’s Treasury, ex parte Smedley [1985] 1 QB 657 (UK).
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challenge the government’s payment of certain sums to the European
Community and in R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex parte
World Development Movement Ltd.,113 a pressure group114 was held to have
sufficient interest to challenge the disbursement of aid funds for the Pergau
Dam in Malaysia. The courts in Singapore appear to have adopted the
“sufficient interest” test, with applicants having to produce a “prima facie
case of reasonable suspicion.”115 However, the Chief Justice has suggested
extra-judicially that this “is not, in my view, also to say that our courts will
apply the [sufficient interest] test with the same rigour as the U.K. courts.”116
Additionally, the case law in both Singapore and Malaysia has
introduced a distinction between public and private rights.117 In Tan Eng
Hong v. Attorney-General, the appellant sought to have a statute invalidated
on constitutional grounds.118 The Singapore Court of Appeal clarified that
“a public right is one which is held and vindicated by public authorities,
whereas a private right is one which is held and vindicated by a private
individual.”119 The applicant who wishes to enforce a public right has to
establish a violation via an injury that is also personal. 120 This doctrine
made an appearance in Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General.121
Jeyaretnam was a member of an opposition party who had sued for
prerogative orders and declarations against a 4 billion USD contingent loan
extended by the Monetary Authority of Singapore to the International
Monetary Fund.122 The Singapore Supreme Court ruled, incidentally, that as
Jeyaretnam was unable to prove any damage particular to himself, he did not
have locus standi.123
113
R. v. Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs ex parte World Development Movement Ltd., [1995] 1
WLR 386 (UK).
114
A pressure group is similar to a lobby or interest group.
115
Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee Lin Linda [2001] 1 SLR 133; see also In re Lim Chor Pee,
ex parte Law Society of Singapore [1985–1986] SLR 998.
116
Chan Sek Keong, supra note 88, at 481.
117
See Government of Malaysia v. Lim Kit Siang [1988] 2 M.L.J. 12 (the Malaysian Supreme Court
declined to follow the liberal approach of English cases, attributing it to the new wording of the English
Rules of the Supreme Court).
118
Tan Eng Hong v. Attorney-General, [2012] SGCA 45, http://www.singaporelaw.sg/sglaw/laws-ofsingapore/case-law/free-law/court-of-appeal-judgments/14979-tan-eng-hong-v-attorney-general-2012-sgca45.
119
Id. at para. 69.
120
See id.
121
Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v Attorney-General [2012] SGHC 2010.
122
Id. (Jeyaretnam contended that the concurrence of the President had not been manifested, contrary
to article 144 of the Singapore Constitution).
123
The Supreme Court of Singapore has two divisions; the higher one is the Court of Appeal and the
lower one is the High Court.

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

106

VOL. 25 NO. 1

Table 3: Summary of Singapore
Interest

Action/
Entity

Test
¾ Sufficient interest
¾ At the first stage, applicant must
have genuine interest
¾ At the second stage, applicant has
to make out “prima facie case of
reasonable suspicion”
¾ Injury has to be personal
¾ Public nature of the power being
exercised

Cases
¾ Lai Swee Lin Linda (adopts the
sufficient interest test)
¾ Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew
(applicant seeking to enforce public
right also has to demonstrate
special injury)
¾ Yeap Wai Kong (reprimand of a
company by the stock exchange is a
public function)

Between 1957 and 2009, there were 79 judicial review cases reported, or an
average of 1.5 cases per year. 124 Although the citizenry has grown
increasingly conscious and assertive of its rights, 125 the practice and
discourse has generally been partial to a non-adversarial relationship
between the executive and the judiciary, with the latter supporting the
former in the mission of good governance.126 There has not been a move
towards a relaxation of locus standi rules.
C.

China

The rise of administrative litigation in China coincided with the legal
and economic reforms of the early 1980s, as the new proprietors of
privately-held corporations acquired both the incentives and the wherewithal
to seek judicial reversal of unfavorable administrative decisions.127 Since
the passage of the Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic
of China of 1989 128 (more accurately translated as the Administrative
Litigation Law, or ALL), the last two decades have witnessed a steady
increase in the number of administrative cases filed by Chinese citizens.129
124

Chan Sek Keong, supra note 88, at 474 (relief was granted in 22 of the 79 cases).
See Yuen-C Tham, When Citizens Take the Government to Court, THE STRAITS TIMES, Jan. 25,
2014, at 37 (Sing.).
126
See, e.g., Tan Boon Teik, Judicial Review, SING. L.R. 70 (1988); Chan Sek Keong, supra note 88.
See also Thio Li-Ann, supra note 92, at 203–04 (“In Singapore, the government ethos of efficiency and
maintaining public order provides the backdrop to the operation and development of administrative law.
The judicial predilection for the utilitarian concerns of efficiency, economy, and effectiveness is evident
from the case law.”).
127
Susan Finder, Like Throwing an Egg Against a Stone—Administrative Litigation in the People's
Republic of China, 3 J. CHINESE. L. 1, 6–9 (1989).
128
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa ( ѝ ॾ Ӫ ≁  ઼ ޡഭ 㹼 ᭯ 䇹 䇬 ⌅ )
[Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by Nat’l People’s Cong.,
Apr. 4, 1989, effective Oct. 1, 1990), http://en.pkulaw.cn/Display.aspx?Lib=law&Id=1204&keyword=
(China) [hereinafter Administrative Procedure Law].
129
See infra Figure 3.
125
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The results of a survey conducted in 2010 show that administrative cases
commenced between 1987 and 2010 may be classified into four main
categories: those involving public security, issues related to urban
construction, land disputes, and labor disputes. The concentration of
lawsuits within these subject matters not only reveals the most salient
interests and concerns of ordinary people, but also reflects the influence of
“standing to sue” as articulated in Article 2, 130 Article 11, 131 and Article
12 132 of the ALL. To bring suit against an administrative agency, a
prospective plaintiff must establish that: 1) the challenged administrative
action directly affected the rights and duties of particular individuals,
corporations, or other organizations; 2) the plaintiff suffered an injury-infact that infringed upon a lawful right and interest; and 3) the administrative
agency was susceptible to suit.133

130
Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 128, at Art. 2 (“A Citizen, A legal person or other
organizations have the right to litigate a lawsuit to the people's courts in accordance with this Law once
they consider that a concrete administrative action by administrative organs or personnels infringe their
lawful rights and interests.”).
131
Id. at Art. 11 (“The people's courts shall accept suits brought by citizens, legal persons or other
organizations against any of the following specific administrative acts: (1) an administrative sanction, such
as detention, fine, rescission of a license or permit, order to suspend production or business or confiscation
of property, which one refuses to accept; (2) a compulsory administrative measure, such as restricting
freedom of the person or the sealing up, seizing or freezing of property, which one refuses to accept; (3)
infringement upon one's managerial decision-making powers, which is considered to have been perpetrated
by an administrative organ; (4) refusal by an administrative organ to issue a permit or license, which one
considers oneself legal qualified to apply for, or its failure to respond to the application; (5) refusal by an
administrative organ to perform its statutory duty of protecting one's rights of the person and of property, as
one has applied for, or its failure to respond to the application; (6) cases where an administrative organ is
considered to have failed to issue a pension according to law; (7) cases where an administrative organ is
considered to have illegally demanded the performance of duties; and (8) cases where an administrative
organ is considered to have infringed upon other rights of the person and of property. Apart from the
provisions set forth in the preceding paragraphs, the people's courts shall accept other administrative suits
which may be brought in accordance with the provisions of relevant laws and regulations.”).
132
Id. at Art. 12 (“The people's courts shall not accept suits brought by citizens, legal persons or other
organizations against any of the following matters: (1) acts of the state in areas like national defence and
foreign affairs; (2) administrative rules and regulations, regulations, or decisions and orders with general
binding force formulated and announced by administrative organs; (3) decisions of an administrative organ
on awards or punishments for its personnel or on the appointment or relief of duties of its personnel; (4)
specific administrative acts that shall, as provided for by law, be finally decided by an administrative
organ.”).
133
He Haibo, Xingzheng Fazhi, Women Haiyou Duoyuan [How Far from Administrative Legalism], 6
ZENGFA LUNTAN [TRIB. POL. SCI. AND L.] 25, 40–41 (2013).
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Figure 3: The Number of Administrative Cases Accepted and Judged
Between 1988 and 2013 in China134
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First, the challenged administrative acts must directly affect the rights
and duties of particular individuals, corporations, or other organizations.135
134
This chart is drawn from data between 1989 and 2014 in the Law Yearbook of China, an annual
publication. Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 759, 771, 802, 819, 835, 849, 862,
876, 891, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (1989–98); Zhongguo Faxuehui
(ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ [China Law Society] 1023, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA]
(1999); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 1211, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ
⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2000); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 1258,
ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2001); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ
) [China Law Society] 777–78, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2002);
Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 645, 675, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻ
ᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2003–04); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 615, 616,
ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2005); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ
) [China Law Society] 487, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2006);
Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 593–94, 617, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅
ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2007–08); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 1001,
ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2009); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ
) [China Law Society] 920, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2010);
Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ) [China Law Society] 1052, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ
䢤 ) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2011); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ ⌅ ᆖՊ ) [China Law Society] 1066, ZHƿ
ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2012); Zhongguo Faxuehui (ѝഭ⌅ᆖՊ
) [China Law Society] 1211, ZHONGGUO FALU NIANJIAN (ѝഭ⌅ᖻᒤ䢤) [LAW Y.B. CHINA] (2013).
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In other words, a prospective plaintiff is entitled to commence an
administrative suit only when the action in question implicates a specific
person or situation. The term is emphasized in Article 2 of the ALL in
contradistinction to internal administrative acts136 and abstract administrative
acts,137 both of which are immune from judicial oversight.138
In 2000, the Chinese Supreme Court promulgated “The Interpretation
of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of ‘Administrative
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China,’” 139 to clarify the
definition of administrative acts not subject to legal challenge as stated in
Article 12 of ALL. Administrative acts not subject to legal challenges
include internal administrative acts, abstract administrative acts,
administrative guidance, and certain official certificates.140
Internal administrative acts are defined as the decisions of an
administrative organ regarding awards, punishments, appointments, or relief
of duty applicable solely to its own personnel. 141 A case involving the
People’s Bank of China (PBOC) provides a suitable illustration. On
November 20, 1988, PBOC dissolved its Jiangxi branch and replaced it with
the newly-founded Wuhan branch. The Wuhan branch resolved to change
the name of the Cadre School of People’s Bank of Jiangxi Province and to
135
See Song Yafang, Juti Xingzheng Xingwei Gainian de Zaisuli [Rethinking the Concept of Specific
Administrative Act], 4 HENAN SHENG ZHENGFA GUANLI GANBU XUEYUAN XUEBAO [JOURNAL OF HENAN
ADMINISTRATIVE INSTITUTE OF POLITICS AND LAW] 4 (2006).
136
Article 12 of ALL states that “[t]he people's courts shall not accept suits brought by citizens, legal
persons or other organizations against . . . decisions of an administrative organ on awards or punishments
for its personnel or on the appointment or relief of duties of its personnel.” Administrative Procedure Law,
supra note 128, at Art. 12.
137
Id. (“The people's courts shall not accept suits brought by citizens, legal persons or other
organizations against … administrative rules and regulations, regulations, or decisions and orders with
general binding force formulated and announced by administrative organs.”).
138
See Guan Baoying, Lun Chouxiang Xingzheng Xingwei yu Juti Xingzheng Zhuti de Fenli
[Separating the Main Body of Abstract Administrative Acts and Specific Administrative Acts], 4 Falv
Pinglun 3 [Law Review] (2006).
139
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu ZhixingǉZhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong FaǊ
Ruogan Wenti De Jieshi, (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾᢗ㹼ǉѝॾӪ≁઼ޡഭ㹼᭯䇹䇬⌅Ǌ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ䀓䟺)
[The Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of “Administrative Procedure
Law of the People’s Republic of China”], (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct., Mar. 8, 2000, effective Mar.
10, 2000), http://vip.chinalawinfo.com/NewLaw2002/SLC/SLC.asp?Db=chl&Gid=26982 [hereinafter
Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of Administrative Procedure Law].
140
Id. at Art. 3–5; Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 126, at Art. 7 (“The people's courts
shall not accept suits brought by citizens, legal persons or other organizations against . . . decisions of an
administrative organ on awards or punishments for its personnel or on the appointment or relief of duties of
its personnel.”); see also He Haibo, supra note 133, at 40.
141
Interpretation of Several Problems referring to the Implementation of Administrative Procedure
Law, supra note 139, at Art. 6.

110

WASHINGTON INTERNATIONAL LAW JOURNAL

VOL. 25 NO. 1

appoint Jiangxi Financial College to manage the school’s employees, funds,
and fixed assets. The Cadre School of People’s Bank of Jiangxi Province
then initiated an administrative suit against the “Notice Related to the
Matters of the Former Cadre School of People’s Bank of Jiangxi Province”
issued by Wuhan Branch of the PBOC.142 The Intermediate Court of Jiangxi
Province found the reorganization undertaken by the Wuhan branch to be an
internal administrative action and accordingly dismissed the appeal.143
As defined by the Supreme People’s Court, abstract administrative
acts are rules, regulations, decisions, and orders that are rules of general
applicability that are formulated and announced by administrative organs.144
The courts may never review abstract administrative acts. One common
example is “red-titled documents,” or hongtou wenjian. 145 These are
directives of departments subordinate to the state council, local people’s
governments at or above the county level and their respective departments,
or town administrations. They are not included in the body of statutes,
administrative regulations, and rules. Xinhua reported that in 2005, sixtyeight “red-titled documents” issued by eleven cities and eighteen
administrative agencies of Heilongjiang Province were contrary to law.146 In
addition, a study conducted in Anhui Province found that as of 2004, sixty
percent of the 110 provincial-level “red-titled documents” were inconsistent

142
Jiangxi Sheng Renmin Yinhang Ganbu Xuexiao Su Zhongguo Renmin Yinhang Wuhan Fenhang
Jinron Jigou Tiaozheng Xingzheng Chuli Jueding An (⊏㾯ⴱӪ≁䬦㹼ᒢ䜘ᆖṑ䇹ѝഭӪ≁䬦㹼↖≹࠶
㹼䠁㶽ᵪᶴ䈳ᮤ㹼᭯༴⨶ߣᇊṸ) [The Cadre School of People’s Bank of Jiangxi Province v. Wuhan
Branch of People’s Bank of China], Dec. 12, 2005 NANCHANG INTERM. PEOPLE’S CT.,
http://hubeigy.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=4110.
143
Id.
144
Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of Administrative Procedure
Law, supra note 139, at Art. 3.
145
See Hongtou Wenjian Pingdian (㓒ཤ᮷Ԧ䇴⛩) [The Notes of Red-Titled Document], (Ӫ≁ᰕᣕ
ǉ ≁ ѫ ᭯ ⋫ Ǌ ઘ ࠺  [PEOPLE’S DAILY: DEMOCRATIC POLITICS WEEKLY] (Jan. 2, 2008),
http://politics.people.com.cn/GB/8198/114987/ (explaining that “red-titled documents” are so named
because they usually bear red titles and stamps; these documents are issued by both central and local
administrative agencies to regulate the duties and rights of citizens under their jurisdiction); see also
Hongtou Wenjian Shiyu Nanbei Chao de Xiwei Shiqi (㓒ཤ᮷ԦҾইेᵍⲴ㾯兿ᰦᵏ) [Red-titled
Documents Originated from Wei Western Period of Nanbei Dynasty], (Ӫ≁ᰕᣕǉ≁ѫ᭯⋫Ǌઘ࠺ 
[PEOPLE’S DAILY: DEMOCRATIC POLITICS WEEKLY] (Jan. 2, 2008), http://history.people.com.cn/n/2014/07
15/c372330-25283205.html.
146
Zengshuang Gao, Rang Hongtou Wenjian Yuanli “Bawang Tiaokuan” [Making “Red-titled
Document” Stay Away from “Inequality Clauses”], XINHUA NEWS AGENCY, July 11, 2005,
http://www.hlj.xinhuanet.com/xw/2005-07/11/content_4613159.htm.
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with applicable laws and regulations. 147 Although contrary to law, these
abstract administrative acts were not reviewed by courts.
There are a few other matters besides abstract and internal
administrative acts that cannot be reviewed by the courts.148 For example,
the decision of governmental bodies to grant funding for the support of
certain local corporations, often classified as administrative guidance, does
not qualify as a specific administrative act149 because it is not binding and
has no direct legal consequences. 150 In addition, an official certificate
pronouncing the recognized cause of and liability for a fire is not subject to
review because it does not alter the existing rights and duties of the involved
parties.151
The injury-in-fact has to infringe upon a plaintiff’s “lawful right and
interest” for the plaintiff to have standing to sue in China. Article 11 further
limits the range of “lawful rights and interests”: the court should only accept
an administrative case if “an administrative organ is considered to have
infringed upon rights of the person and of property.”152 Thus, other rights,
such as those associated with environmental damage and degradation may
not be litigated under the ALL. In 2001, two professors from Southeast
China University alleged that a viewing tower built on the peak of Purple
Mountain was inimical to the preservation of natural and historical sites and
147

E.g., The Industrial and Commercial Bureau of Anhui (ICB) promulgated a red-titled document
that required businesses engaged in advertising to be certified as “credible organizations” so as to avoid a
presumption of false advertising. This was found by the Legal Affairs Office of Anhui to be illegal because
it bypassed the legislative process to impose additional obligations on local businesses. Keqiang Tao,
Renmin Shiping: Haiyou Duoshao “Hongtou Wenjian” De Weifa Tiaokuan Meiyou Jiuzheng [How Many
the Illegal Provisions of “Red Tapes” Have Not Been Corrected?], PEOPLE’S DAILY, Nov. 17, 2004,
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/guandian/1033/2995065.html.
148
See Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of Administrative
Procedure Law, supra note 139.
149
Dianshi Longsheng Shichai Chang Bufu Fuding Shi Renmin Zhengfu Xingzheng Fuyou Fuqiang
Cuoshi An (⛩⸣䲶㜌⸣ᶀলнᴽ⾿唾ᐲӪ≁᭯ᓌ㹼᭯ᢦՈᢦᕪ᧚ᯭṸ㸧 [Diantou Longsheng Stone
Co., Ltd. v. Fuding Municipal People’s Government] (Fuding Local Ct. July 19,2001), http://old.chinacourt
.org/html/article/200211/04/17116.shtml.
150
Id.
151
See Huangmou Su Chongqing Shi Wanzhou Qu Gongan Xiaofang Zhidui (哴Ḁ䇹䟽ᒶᐲзᐎ४
ޜᆹ⎸䱢᭟䱏) [Huang v. Wanzhou Dist. Fire Department] (Chongqing Wanzhou NO.2 Interm. People’s
Ct. Aug. 7, 2007), http://www.cq2zfy.gov.cn/information/displaycont.asp?newsid=14639. See also
Gongan Bu Guanyu Dui Huozai Shigu Zeren Rending Bufu Shifou Shu Xingzheng Susong Shouan Fanwei
De Pifu (ޜᆹ䜘ޣҾሩ⚛⚮һ᭵䍓ԫ䇔ᇊнᴽᱟ㹼᭯䇹䇬ਇṸ㤳തⲴᢩ༽) [Official Reply of
Ministry of Public Security about Whether the Recognition Certificate of Fire Liability Has Standing to Sue
in Administrative Litigations] (promulgated by the Ministry of Public Security, effective Mar. 20, 2000),
http://www.chinalawedu.com/falvfagui/fg22598/55390.shtml.
152
Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 128, at Art. 6.
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harmed the environmental benefits of the public.153 They sued the Nanjing
Planning Bureau for failing to respect their lawful property rights based on
the argument that they bought an annual tour ticket for Purple Mountain.154
However, the Nanjing Municipal Intermediate Court did not accept the suit,
citing insufficient injury-in fact.155 This rejection exemplifies two common
hurdles to establish the infringement of a “lawful right and interest”: the
non-recognition of political and social rights, and the burden of
demonstrating that a plaintiff was directly affected by the administrative
action.
As a general matter, personal and property rights in Chinese law do
not encompass political and social rights, even those ostensibly guaranteed
by the Constitution.156 The withholding of approval for the establishment of
a social organization, cancellation of organizational registration, and
restrictions on demonstrations are generally not grievances that may be
brought into the courtroom.157 In administrative cases implicating political
153

Wu Weixing, Lun Huanjingquan De Sifa Baozhang [Judicial Guarantee of Environmental Rights],
THE RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW WUHAN UNIVERSITY (June 29, 2003),
http://www.riel.whu.edu.cn/article.asp?id=25509.
154
Id.
155
Id. See also Shi Jianhui, Gu Dasong Su Nanjingshi Guihuaju Weifa Xingzheng An (ᯭᔪ䖹ǃ亮
བྷᶮ䇹ইӜᐲ㿴ࡂተ䘍⌅㹼᭯Ṹ [The Case of Shi Jianhui, Gu Dasong v. Nanjing Planning Bureau
Against Illegal Administrative Acts] (Nov. 16, 2004), RESEARCH INSTITUTE OF ENVIRONMENTAL LAW,
WUHAN UNIVERSITY, http://www.riel.whu.edu.cn/article.asp?id=26404.
156
There is no constitutional court in China. Although the Chinese Constitution is accorded
deference both publicly and officially, in practice, it is an exhortatory document that is not applied or
interpreted. The origin of this phenomenon can be traced back to an official reply from the Supreme
People’s Court in 1955, which stated that the “the Constitution is the fundamental law of the state and has
supreme legal authority. . . . It does not include the regulation on how to convict and punish in the field of
criminal law. Thus, we agree with the judicial decision made by your court, the Constitution shall not be
applied as the legal basis of conviction and punishment in the criminal cases.” Zuigao Renmin Fayuan
Guanyu Zai Xingshi Panjue Zhong Buyi Yuanyin Xianfa Zuo Lunzui Kexing De Yiju De Fuhan㸦ᴰ儈Ӫ
≁⌅䲒ޣҾ൘ࡁһࡔߣѝнᇌᨤᕅᇚ⌅䇪㖚、ࡁⲴ࠭༽Ⲵᦞ㸧[The Official Reply of Supreme
Court Regarding to the Statement that Constitution Shall Not be Applied to Be the Legal Basis of
Conviction and Punishment in the Criminal Cases] (promulgated by Sup. People’s Ct. July 20, 1955,
effective July 20, 1955), http://www.chinacourt.org/law/detail/1955/07/id/142.shtml.
The Chinese
Constitution has only been applied to interpret a case in two instances, and has subsequently disappeared
from all other written judgments. See Qi Yuling Su Chen Xiaoqi Maoming Dingti Dao Luqu Qide
Zhongzhuan Xuexiao Jiudu Qinfan Xingmingquan Shoujiaoyu De Quanli Sunhai Peichang An㸦喀⦹㤃䇹
䱸ᲃ⩚߂亦ᴯࡠᖅਆަⲴѝуᆖṑቡ䈫ץ⣟ဃᵳǃਇᮉ㛢Ⲵᵳ࡙ᦏᇣ䎄گṸ㸧[Qi Yuling v.
Chen Xiaoqi], (Shandong High People’s Ct., Aug. 23, 2001) 㸪 CIL.C.21952 (EN) (PKUlaw),
http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=pfnl&Gid=117462464&keyword=
滸
⋢
ⱎ
&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate; Yuandong Xie ( 䉒 䘌 ь ) Shi Yuequan Haishi Hufa
ZhongziGuansi De Yiwai Zhanfang (ᱟ䎺ᵳ䘈ᱟᣔ⌅ᆀᇈਨⲴཆ㔭᭮) [The Analysis of Zhong Zi
Case: Overstepping Authority or Protecting Law], ( Ӫ ≁ ᰕ ᣕ *! PEOPLE’S DAILY, (Nov. 26, 2003),
http://www.people.com.cn/GB/14576/14528/2213325.html.
157
He Haibo, supra note 133, at 40-41.
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or social rights, standing may be granted only if specifically authorized by
statute. 158 For instance, Article 33 of the “Regulation of the People's
Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government Information” authorizes
courts to hear citizen requests for information based on the violation of a
political right without having to inquire into the existence of a direct
harm. 159 In 2008, municipal-level governments handled 683 petitions for
administrative reconsideration of Open Government Information (OGI)
requests.160
It is also important to note that Article 12 of the “Interpretation of
Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of ‘Administrative
Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China’” further requires that the
purported infringement directly affect a litigant’s personal and property
rights. 161 Thus, citizens may not question governmental expenditures
through administrative litigation on the theory that they are taxpayers.162 For
instance, in 2006, a farmer sued Changning Municipal Financial Bureau for
purchasing two unbudgeted cars.163 The Changning Municipal Intermediate
Court declined to receive the lawsuit on the basis that the act in question did
not directly concern the plaintiff.164

158

Id.
Article 33 of Regulation of the People's Republic of China on the Disclosure of Government
Information states, “where any citizen, legal person or any other organization believes that a specific
administrative act committed by an administrative organ in carrying out government information disclosure
work has infringed upon his/its legal rights and interests, he/it may apply for administrative reconsideration
or bring an administrative lawsuit according to law.” Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Zhengfu Xinxi
Gongkai Tiaoli㸦ѝॾӪ≁઼ޡഭ᭯ᓌؑޜᔰᶑֻ㸧[Regulation of the People's Republic of China on
the Disclosure of Government Information] (promulgated by St. Council, Apr. 5, 2007, effective May 1,
2008), Art. 33, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=90387&lib=law.
160
Jamie P. Horsley, Update on China’s Open Government Information Regulations: Surprising
Public Demand Yielding Some Positive Results, FREEDOMINFO.ORG Apr. 23, 2010,
http://www.law.yale.edu/documents/pdf/Intellectual_Life/CLOGI_Update_for_freedominfo_Horsley_articl
e_4-6-10.pdf.
161
Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of Administrative Procedure
Law, supra note 139, at Art. 7.
162
See Jiang Shilin Su Henan Sheng Changning Xian Caizhengju An (㪻⸣᷇䇹⒆ইⴱᑨᆱ৯䍒᭯
ተṸ) [Shilin Jiang v. Changning Municipal Financial Bureau]; see also Jiang Shilin Su Changning Shi
Caizheng Ju Weifa Gouche An ( 㪻 ⸣ ᷇ 䇹ᑨ ᆱ ᐲ 䍒᭯ ተ 䘍 ⌅ 䍝 䖖 Ṹ) [Shilin Jiang v. Changning
Municipal Financial Bureau against unbudgeted cars’ purchase], http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2006-1229/183711917743.shtml (last visited Oct. 26, 2015); He Haibo, supra note 133, at 41.
163
Id.
164
Id.; see also Huang Yuanjian (哴)ڕݳ, Gongyi Susong Yu Caizheng Jiandu—Jiang Shilin Su
Hunan Sheng Changzhou Shi Caizheng Ju An (⳺ޜ䇹䇬о䍒᭯ⴁⶓü㪻⸣᷇䇹⒆ইⴱᑨᆱᐲ䍒᭯ተ
Ṹ) [Public Interests Litigations and Financial Supervision: Jiang Shilin v. Changning Municipal Financial
Bureau], Beijing Yingxiang Lushi Shiwu Suo (ेӜᐲѹ⍮ᖻᐸһᡰ >BEIJING IMPACT LAW FIRM]
(Apr. 4, 2007), http://www.bjimpact.org/Article.asp?ArticleID=280.
159
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Third, the authority complained of must be susceptible to suit.165 The
“Interpretation of Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of
‘Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China’”
classifies all organizations exercising an administrative power delegated in
accordance with the law as administrative organs.166 In 1997, Chen Jianeng
sued the Organization Department of Sichuan Province167 after he had been
reassigned by his employer, the Sichuan Petroleum Administration, as a
result of the defendant’s action.168 The Supreme People’s Court dismissed
Chen’s appeal on standing grounds. 169 Even though the Organization
Department of Sichuan Province’s decision would probably have been
unreviewable as an internal administrative act, the court did not reach that
question, basing its verdict on the definition of administrative organs.170 The
Organization Department of Sichuan Province is apparently not an
organization legally vested with administrative power. 171 The cases also
suggest that Chinese courts would exempt some forms of public associations
165
Although the ALL does not explicitly qualify the right of action against administrative acts of the
CCP, these cases rarely gain standing as a matter of practice. The Chinese State Council, as the highest
administrative organ, possesses a unique legal status, distinctive from other administrative bodies, and is
only rarely vulnerable to administrative litigation. Article XIV of Administrative Reconsideration Law of
the People’s Republic of China authorizes the State Council to function as a court of law and to render a
final ruling on administrative reconsideration appeals. “The applicant who refuses to accept the
administrative reconsideration decision may bring a suit before a people's court; or apply to the State
Council for a ruling, and the State Council shall make a final ruling according to the provisions of this Law.ā
Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Fuyi Fa (2009 Xiuzheng) (ѝॾӪ≁઼ޡഭ㹼᭯༽䇞⌅˄2009
ᒤ[ )˅↓؞Administrative Reconsideration Law of the People’s Republic of China (2009 Amendment)]
(promulgated by Standing Committee of the National People’s Congress, Aug. 27, 2009, effective Aug. 27,
2009) Art. 14, http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=167114&lib=law. To some extent, this prevented the
Chinese State Council from being named as a defendant in an administrative suit. See He Haibo, supra note
133, at 40–41.
166
Article 1 states that, “a citizen, a legal person or other organizations have the right to litigate a
lawsuit to the people’s courts once they consider that a concert administrative action by administrative
organs or other organizations that exercise administrative power.” Interpretation of Several Problems
Referring to the Implementation of Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 137, at Art. 1.
167
Because the People’s Republic of China is a party-dominated state, the Organization Department
has an enormous amount of control over personnel within the PRC. The Organization Department is
indispensable to the CPC’s power, and the key to its hold over personnel throughout every level of
government and industry. It is one of the key agencies of the Central Committee, along with the Central
Propaganda Department and International Liaison Department. See SICHUAN ZU GONG WANG (ഋᐍ㓴ᐕ
㖁 [ORGANIZATION DEPARTMENT OF SICHUAN], http://www.gcdr.gov.cn/info/ (last visited Nov. 24, 2014).
168
Chen Jianeng Su Sichuan Shengwei Zuzhi Bu Qinquan Shangsu An (䱸హ㜭䇹ഋᐍⴱင㓴㓷䜘
ץᵳк䇹Ṹ) [Jianeng Chen v. The Organization Ministry of Sichuan Province], (promulgated by Sup.
People’s Ct., 1997), http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=pfnl&Gid=118324465&keyword=旰
⬟ &EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate; see also http://www.pkulaw.cn/case/pfnl_118324465.ht
ml?keywords=䱸హ㜭䇹ഋᐍⴱင㓴㓷䜘&match=Exact.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id.
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from review. For example, in Changchun Yatai v. Chinese Football Council,
the Beijing Municipal Second Intermediate Court concluded that the plaintiff
could not contest the decisions of a “self-regulating organization.”172 This is
despite the fact that the Council discharges an administrative function under
the “Law of the People’s Republic of China on Physical Culture and
Sports.”173
The number of administrative cases handled by the Chinese courts has
grown in the twenty-six years following the introduction of the ALL in 1989.
Despite this, they make up only a minor fraction of the caseload of Chinese
courts. Between 1998 and 2002, there were only 463,328 administrative
cases, accounting for a mere 1.73% of all cases decided by the Chinese
judiciary in these five years. 174 The three elements summarized below
partially reflect the relatively narrow standing granted to plaintiffs under
Chinese administrative law.

172

See Han Yong, Anli Fenxi Changchuan Yatai Julebu Su Zhongguo Zuxie Xingzheng Chufa
Budang (Ṹֻ࠶᷀䮯᱕ӊ⌠ءҀ䜘䇹ѝഭ䏣ॿ㹼᭯༴㖊нᖃ) [The Case Analysis: Changchun Yatai v.
Chinese Football Council] (Jun. 2006), TIYU YU FALÜ JIUFEN ANLI PINGXI [SPORTS AND LAW: CASE
ANALYSIS ON SPORTS DISPUTES], http://article.chinalawinfo.com/ArticleHtml/Article_33179.shtml (last
visited Dec. 12, 2014).
173
The State practices classified administration of sports competitions at different levels.
Comprehensive national games shall be administered by the administrative department for physical culture
and sports under the State Council or by the administrative department for physical culture and sports under
the State Council in conjunction with other relevant organizations. National competition of an individual
sport shall be administered by the national association of the said sport. Measures for the administration of
local comprehensive sports games and local individual sport competitions shall be formulated by the local
people's governments. See Zhongguo Renmin Gongheguo Tiyufa (ѝഭӪ≁઼ޡഭփ㛢⌅) [Law of the
People’s Republic of China on Physical Culture and Sports] (promulgated by Standing Comm. of the Nat'l
People’s Cong., Aug. 29, 1995, effective Oct.1, 1995) (China), http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?
Db=chl&Gid=12674&keyword=փ㛢⌅&EncodingName=&Search_Mode=accurate.
174
Jiangxisheng Gaoji Renmin Fayuan Ketizu 㸦⊏㾯ⴱ儈㓗Ӫ≁⌅䲒䈮仈㓴㸧[The Research
Group of Jiangxi Provincial Higher People’s Court], Xingzheng Susong Fa Shishi Wenti De Shizheng Fenxi
Yu Sikao Jianlun Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susongfa De Xiugai 㸦㹼᭯䇹䇬⌅ᇎᯭ䰞仈
Ⲵᇎ䇱 ࠶᷀ оᙍ㘳 ˖ެ 䇪ǉѝॾӪ≁઼ޡഭ㹼᭯䇹 䇬⌅Ǌ Ⲵ ؞᭩) [The Empirical Study of the
Implementation of “Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China”], 5 J. L.
APPLICATION 38, 39 (2004).
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Table 4: Summary of China
Interest

¾
¾
¾
¾

Action

Entity

¾
¾
¾
¾

China (Pre-2014)
Lawful right and interest
Limited to person and property
Direct harm, i.e. no interest as a
taxpayer
Other political rights as authorized
by statute
Specific administrative acts
Excludes internal or abstract
administrative acts
Leaves out administrative guidance
Organizations exercising an
administrative power delegated by
law

China (Post-2014)
¾ Includes open information, social
security, and educational rights

¾ Number of enumerated categories
of cases increased from 8 to 12
¾ Organization empowered by a law,
regulation, or rule

The National People’s Congress (NPC) has recently promulgated
amendments to the ALL, effective May 1, 2015, that formally relax some of
these standing requirements.175 The rights that may be vindicated through
administrative litigation are no longer restricted to those implicating persons
or property and now include open information, social security, and
educational rights. 176 Also, administrative acts taken by an organization
empowered by a law, regulation, or rule may now be the subject of suit.177
In addition, citizens challenging an administrative action may
simultaneously file a request for review of the relevant regulation.178 Finally,
even though the types of reviewable administrative cases are defined
through enumeration rather than exclusion, the listed categories have
175

Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Xingzheng Susong Fa (2014 Xiuzheng) (ѝॾӪ≁઼ޡഭ㹼᭯䇹
䇬⌅ (2014 [ ))↓؞Administrative Litigation Law of the People’s Republic of China (2014 Amendment)]
(promulgated by Nat’l Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Nov. 1, 2014, effective May 1, 2015), Art. 7,
http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=239820&lib=law [hereinafter Administrative Litigation Law].
176
Ying Songnian, Xingzheng Susong Fa Xiugai De Liangdian Yu Qidai (ǉ㹼᭯䇹䇬⌅Ǌ؞᭩ⲴӞ
⛩оᵏᖵ) [The Insights and Prospective of the Amendment of Administrative Litigation Law], LEGAL
DAILY, Jan. 28, 2015; see also Tian Yong su Beijing Keji Daxue (⭠≨䇹ेӜ、ᢰབྷᆖ) [Tian Yong v
Beijing Univ. of Sci. and Tech.], Sup. People’s Ct. Judicial Comm., Guidance Case No. 38 (Sup. People’s
Ct. 1999) (protecting claimants’ educational rights; decided in February 1999 and selected to be a Guiding
Case on January 7, 2015), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/12/id/1524355.shtml.
177
Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 175, at Art. 2 (“The term ‘administrative action’ as
mentioned in the preceding paragraph includes administrative actions taken by an organization empowered
by a law, regulation, or rule.”). See also Tian Yong su Beijing Keji Daxue (⭠≨䇹ेӜ、ᢰབྷᆖ) [Tian
Yong v Beijing Univ. of Sci. and Tech.], Sup. People’s Ct. Judicial Comm., Guidance Case No. 38 (Sup.
People’s Ct. 1999), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/12/id/1524355.shtml (confirming higher
education institutes can be sued as defendants in administrative litigations; decided February 1999 and
selected to be a Guiding Case on January 7, 2015).
178
Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 175, at Art. 53 (this only applies to the regulations of a
department of the State Council or by a local people’s government or department).
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expanded from eight179 to twelve.180 In April 2015, the Supreme People’s
Court issued a judicial interpretation to guide courts in applying the 2014
amendments.181 For example, a court should accept a case if it is otherwise
unable to come to a decision in seven days. 182 The document further
suggests that courts give appropriate advice to organizations responsible for
illegal “red-titled documents” and to apprise a supervising body, such as the
local government or the administrative agency at the next level of
government, of its recommendations.183 While these changes are intended to
encourage administrative litigation, it is still too early to assess their
practical impact.
COMPARISON OF SYSTEMS AND THE POLITICAL ECONOMY ANALYSIS

IV.

The scope of this paper has compelled us to paint in broad strokes, but
looking to both the state of the law of standing as well as trends in each case
study country, there are a few salient observations. It is probably fair to say
that for much of the last decade, prior to the 2014 amendment to the ALL,
administrative litigation standing was broader in Japan than in China. First,
only specific administrative acts were reviewable in Chinese courts under
the 1989 statute. In particular, non-binding decisions are not subject to suit.
The doctrinal equivalent in Japan is that of shobunsei. However, Takano,
decided in 2004, suggests that administrative guidance in Japan may no
longer be as insulated from judicial review as it once was. 184 Second,
Japanese law has gradually come to embrace a broader conception of “legal
interest.” As codified in the 2004 amendments to the ACLL and illustrated
by the Odakyǌ Railroad Case, one may now sue on the basis of a legal
179

Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 128, at Art. 11.
Administrative Litigation Law, supra note 175, at Art. 12. For example, decisions on
expropriation or requisition or decisions on compensation for expropriation or requisition can be challenged
in courts. See Xuan Yi Cheng Deng Su Zhejiang Sheng Quzhou Shi Guotu Ziyuan Ju (ᇓᠯᡀㅹ䇹⎉⊏ⴱ
㺒ᐎᐲഭ൏䍴Ⓚተ) [Xuan Yi Cheng v. Quzhou City Land Res. Bureau], Sup. People’s Ct. Judicial
Comm., Guidance Case No. 38 (Sup. People’s Ct. 2003), http://www.chinacourt.org/article/detail/2014/12/i
d/1524380.shtml, (holding that the administrative decision about the right to use a land was illegal;
judgment made in August 2003 and selected to be a Guiding Case on December 25, 2014).
181
Zuigao Renmin Fayuan Guanyu Shiyong “Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Susong Fa” Ruogan
Wenti De Jieshi (ᴰ儈Ӫ≁⌅䲒ޣҾ䘲⭘ǉѝॾӪ≁઼ޡഭ㹼᭯䇹䇬⌅Ǌ㤕ᒢ䰞仈Ⲵ䀓䟺) [The
Interpretation of Supreme People’s Court on Several Problems Referring to the Implementation of
“Administrative Procedure Law of the People’s Republic of China”] (promulgated by Supreme People’s
Ct., Apr. 22, 2015, effective May 1, 2015), http://www.pkulaw.cn/fulltext_form.aspx?Db=chl&Gid=24745
3&EncodingName=.
182
Id. at Art. 1.
183
Id. at Art. 2, 20–21.
184
Saikǀ Saibansho [Sup. Ct.] July 15, 2004, 59 SAIKƿ SAIBANSHO MINJI HANREISHǋ [MINSHǋ] 1661
(Japan), http://www.courts.go.jp/app/hanrei_en/detail?id=760.
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interest that is protected by laws and regulations relevant to the ones
governing the administration disposition. The court not only has to consider
the language of the statute, but also its overall “purport and purpose.”185 In
contrast, the lawful interests that may form the basis for an administrative
case in China must involve persons or property (unless special dispensation
had been granted by legislative fiat). 186 Third, the Japanese ACLL
recognizes a category of “public suits,” or minshǌ soshǀ, that dispenses with
subjective legal interest as a requirement for standing. The statutory
availability of such suits has exposed the operational information and
finances of local governments to citizen scrutiny. Although Chinese law has
also dispensed with some of the elements of standing when it comes to OGI,
taxpayers may not sue local authorities for restitution of misused public
funds.
The comparison with Singapore is more challenging. There are no
legal constraints on the type of injury that must be suffered for a complaint
to be validly heard in Singapore, save that it be personal to the complainant.
Furthermore, as laid down in Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee Lin
Linda, the courts in Singapore utilize the nature test in addition to the source
test to determine which bodies are subject to judicial review. 187 But the
Singapore Parliament has never authorized freedom of information statutes
or taxpayer suits. It is also clear that such cases would be rejected in the
Singapore courts for want of standing, as demonstrated by Jeyaretnam
Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General.188 While the sufficient interest test
(“prima facie case of reasonable suspicion”) obliges the judge to reach the
merits before ascertaining locus standi, precedent in this area of Singapore
law is, unfortunately, sparse.189 However, the Chief Justice’s extra-judicial
comments hint at the possibility of a stricter standard than that applied by the
English courts. In the absence of well-developed case law in this common
law jurisdiction, one can only hazard a guess that the legal barriers to
standing are as imposing in Singapore as they are in China.
The previous observations juxtaposed the state of the law in each of
the three countries’ systems. However, it is also instructive to adopt a
dynamic rather than static perspective. This approach looks at how the law
has evolved in each of the countries studied. The literature reveals that
185

Narufumi Kadomatsu, supra note 68 at 156. See also Yuichero Tsuji, supra note 70, at 354.
Administrative Procedure Law, supra note 128.
187
See Public Service Commission v. Lai Swee Lin Linda [2001] 1 SLR 133.
188
Jeyaretnam Kenneth Andrew v. Attorney-General [2012] SGCH 2010.
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Id. at paras. 10–11.
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Japan’s standing requirements have experienced significant liberalization
over the last decade. In China, very recent amendments to the ALL promise
to subject a broader class of administrative conduct to judicial review. In
contrast, Singapore administrative law has not moved in a similar direction
and has generally remained static.
The question then is whether the rational choice tradition explains the
differences over time between countries. We observe, first, that the
executive and the legislature tend to be politically unified in one-party
dominated states regardless of governmental structure. In Japan, the Prime
Minister is the head of government, appointed from members of the
bicameral Diet. Because he has to command the confidence of the House of
Representatives, the Prime Minister usually belongs to the majority party.
The same is true in Singapore, which inherited the U.K.’s Westminster
model of parliamentary democracy. Although the “executive authority of
Singapore” is vested in the President,190 the Cabinet is tasked with “general
direction and control of the Government.”191 The Prime Minister presides
over the Cabinet and appoints its members.192 Since independence in 1965,
the Prime Minister of Singapore has always been a member of the ruling
People’s Action Party (PAP). In China, the Constitution describes the NPC
as the “highest organ of state power,” overseeing the State Council, the State
Central Military Commission, the Supreme People’s Court, and the Supreme
People’s Procuratorate.193 Although there are formally eight other political
parties that are nominally represented in the NPC, many see the legislature
as little more than a rubber-stamp for national policy decisions taken by the
Politburo Standing Committee (PSC) of the Chinese Communist Party
(CCP).194

190

Constitution of the Republic of Singapore (1999 Reprint) Art 23.
Id. at Art 24.
Id. at Art 28.
193
XIANFA art. 57 (1982), http://en.pkulaw.cn/display.aspx?cgid=1457&lib=law.
194
See, e.g., HE WEIFANG, IN THE NAME OF JUSTICE: STRIVING FOR RULE OF LAW IN CHINA 129
(2012). See also Eric Ip, Judicial Review in China: A Positive Political Economy Analysis, 8 REV. L. &
ECON. 331, 334 (2012).
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Figure 4: China’s Political Structure as Implemented195
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A second factor that fades in importance in party-dominated states is
the distinction between common and civil law institutions. It is said that
common law judges, being further removed from the administrative arm of
the state, tend to enjoy more freedom than civil law judges.196 However,
judicial actors in the countries we have selected tend to be reluctant to
deviate from the preferences of the political elite. There is some empirical
evidence supporting the assertion that Japanese judges who antagonized the
government were penalized by being rotated to less prestigious positions.197
In addition, it has been suggested that this internal reluctance to dabble in
contrarian politics developed as a mechanism to preserve judiciary
independence.198 In Singapore, a common law jurisdiction, courts display a
similar passivity when it comes to challenging the State. A number of
commentators have noted that the judiciary adheres to a thin conception of
rule of law, 199 a position induced by co-option and internalization of the

195
See, e.g., Zhu Weijing, Charting Chinese Politics, WORLD OF CHINESE (Nov. 29, 2013),
http://www.theworldofchinese.com/2013/11/charting-chinese-politics/.
196
See, e.g., Garoupa & Mathews, supra note 2, at 12.
197
Mark J. Ramseyer & Eric B. Rasmusen, Judicial Independence in a Civil Law Regime: The
Evidence from Japan, 13 J.L. ECON. & ORG. 259, 278 (1997). See also Setsuo Miyazawa, Administrative
Control of Japanese Judges, in LAW AND TECHNOLOGY IN THE PACIFIC COMMUNITY 263 (Philip S.C.
Lewis ed., 1994).
198
See Masaki Abe, The Internal Control of a Bureaucratic Judiciary: The Case of Japan, 23 INT’L J.
SOC. L. 303 (1995).
199
A thin conception of the rule of law sees rule of law as being procedural in nature; there is rule of
law if laws are properly enacted, not retroactive, etc. In contrast, a thick conception of the rule of law sees
rule of law as having a substantive component such as limitations on the powers of the state vis-à-vis the
individual.
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ruling party’s communitarian ideology.200 In China, as previously recounted,
the judiciary is formally subordinate to the legislature. The president of the
Supreme People’s Court presents a report to the Politburo Standing
Committee of the NPC every year.201 The Supreme People’s Court’s 2009
advice to lower courts to reject any case involving government-initiated
demolition and relocation is further evidence of politics prevailing over
law. 202 Thus, one should expect that in these countries, the reach of
administrative law will be more or less confined to the limits imposed by the
political leadership, sharpening the salience of PPT for administrative law.
There are, however, differences between Japan, Singapore, and China
that could account for variation in how the classes of eligible plaintiffs in
administrative cases are defined. First, although the Liberal Democratic
Party (LDP) in Japan was reelected in every national election from 1955 to
1990, it has traditionally been, at least by some accounts, a highly
factionalized unit.203 The defection from the party ranks in the summer of
1993 dealt the LDP a blow from which it has yet to fully recover. A noconfidence vote in the lower house was followed by a reversal in the ensuing
elections which saw the LDP lose its majority in the House of
Representatives for the first time. While the LDP later restored its majority
in the House of Representatives after the 2005 General Election, it was
decisively routed in the 2009 House elections by the Democratic Party of
Japan (DPJ). In short, by the mid-1990s the specter of electoral competition
and defeat hung over the LDP. Conversely, there has been no such pressure
in Singapore or China. Although the PAP in Singapore saw its share of the
popular vote decline between the 2001 and 2006 Parliamentary Elections,
and again in 2011, there has not been a genuine challenge to its position as

200

See, e.g., Thio Li-ann, Rule of Law within a Non-Liberal “Communitarian” Democracy: The
Singapore Experience, in ASIAN DISCOURSES OF RULE OF LAW 183 (Randall Peerenboom ed., 2004);
Eugene K.B. Tan, ‘WE’ v. ‘I’: Communitarian Legalism in Singapore, 4 AUSTL. J. ASIAN L. 1 (2002); Tey
Tsun Hang, Judicial Internalising of Singapore’s Supreme Political Ideology, 40 H.K.L.J. 293 (2010);
Jothie Rajah, Punishing Bodies, Securing the Nation: How Rule of Law can Legitimate the Urbane
Authoritarian State, 36 LAW & SOC. INQUIRY 945 (2011); Gordon Silverstein, Singapore: The Exception
that Proves Rules Matter, in RULE BY LAW: THE POLITICS OF COURTS IN AUTHORITARIAN REGIMES 73
(Tom Ginsburg & Tamir Moustafa eds., 2008); FRANCIS SEOW, BEYOND SUSPICION? THE SINGAPORE
JUDICIARY XV–XX (2006).
201
HE WEIFANG, supra note 194.
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Id.
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See, e.g., MARK J. RAMSEYER & FRANCES MCCALL ROSENBLUTH, JAPAN'S POLITICAL
MARKETPLACE 59 (1993); BRADLEY M. RICHARDSON, JAPANESE DEMOCRACY: POWER, COORDINATION,
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the government party.204 The position of the CCP in China has also not been
meaningfully or realistically threatened.
There are two theoretical possibilities here. The first relies on the
concept of zones of tolerance.205 The rivalry within the LDP, as well as its
subsequent failure to retain its majority in the House of Representatives,
may have raised the transaction costs of disciplining an assertive judiciary
and presented reform-minded judges with an opportunity for judicial
lawmaking. The second, encountered earlier, is the idea that politicians use
the judiciary as a form of insurance against electoral turnover. The
heightened political uncertainty, especially after the splintering of the LDP,
might have recommended such a move to risk-averse legislators. It thus
seems as if the courts in Japan should have played a more active role in
reviewing administrative action than in Singapore or China, and even more
so in the recent decade. Although one cannot be confident in saying that it
was easier to bring an administrative case in Japan than in Singapore or
China before 1993, restrictions on standing under Japanese law have been
gradually eroded over the last ten years.
However, whether political fragmentation is the genuine reason for
this development may be disputed. The bureaucrats in Japan loom large in
state affairs, leading some to wonder who actually governs the country.206 In
this vein, commentators on Japanese law have surmised that the shift in the
legal landscape could be driven by politicians attempting to rein in the civil
service. 207 For example, Hitoshi Ushijima, a professor of law at Chuo
University, speculates that “the LDP, partly supported by the opposition JDP,
has been trying to challenge the traditionally strong bureaucracy through
administrative, regulatory, and judicial reforms, and producing
administrative law-conscious lawyers.”208 The erosion of public trust in the
204

See, e.g., Kenny Chee, Not Ready to Lead for Now, Says Opposition, ASIAONE NEWS (Mar. 24,
2011), http://news.asiaone.com/News/AsiaOne+News/Singapore/Story/A1Story20110324-269714.html.
205
See Lee Epstein, Jack Knight, & Olga Shvetsova, The Role of Constitutional Courts in the
Establishment and Maintenance of Democratic Systems of Government, 35 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 117 (2001);
see also Mate, supra note 9.
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See, e.g., CHALMERS JOHNSON, MITI AND THE JAPANESE MIRACLE: THE GROWTH OF INDUSTRIAL
POLICY: 1925–1975 320–24 (1982); KAREL VAN WOLFEREN, THE ENIGMA OF JAPANESE POWER: PEOPLE
AND POLITICS IN A STATELESS NATION 216–20 (1989); RAMSEYER & ROSENBLUTH, supra note 203, at 121.
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GOODMAN, supra note 37, at 462 (observing that “[t]here has been a drive for regulatory reform in
Japan with emphasis on reducing the power of the bureaucracy.”).
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HITOSHI USHIJIMA, supra note 68, at 88; see Katsuya Uga, Development of the Concepts of
Transparency and Accountability in Japanese Administrative Law, in LAW IN JAPAN: A TURNING POINT
276, 294 (Daniel H. Foote ed., 2007) (“[T]he LDP itself also overcame its strong allergy to information
disclosure once it had experienced a period as an opposition party. Through that experience, the LDP

JANUARY 2016

EXPLAINING COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

123

bureaucracy after a series of scandals in the 1990s provided the opportune
moment for politicians to seize the initiative.209 However, this is unlikely to
be the whole story since the case law had evolved even prior to the 2004
amendments to the Administrative Case Litigation Law.
The second source of variance between Japan, Singapore, and China
may be found in the relationship between national and local governments.
Singapore is an island country 274.1 square miles in size.210 There are no
local governments operating in the city-state. Although each constituency
has its own town council, these organizations are headed by the local
Member of Parliament (MP) and typically charged with managing the
common areas of Housing Development Board estates. Japan, on the other
hand, is organized into forty-seven administrative divisions.
The
constitution guarantees local self-government, and Article 93 provides for
the establishment of “deliberative organs,” further specifying that “chief
executive officers of all local public entities, the members of their
assemblies, and such other local officials as may be determined by law shall
be elected by direct popular vote within their several communities.” 211
Article 95 also prohibits the Diet from enacting laws “applicable only to one
local public entity . . . without the consent of the majority of voters of the
local public entity concerned.”212 The national government may, however,
assign functions to local governments for the implementation of national
programs. It also exercises influence over local initiatives through the
budget. The latter phenomenon is sardonically encapsulated in the phrase
san-wari jichi, or “one-third autonomy,” a reference to the percentage of
local government revenue generated by local taxes.213
Similar to Japan, China is organized into thirty-four administrative
regions, including twenty-three provinces, five municipal districts, four
counties, and two special administrative regions.214 Each division has its
own people’s government and congress that fall directly under the Chinese
discovered that information disclosure would strengthen its position vis-à-vis bureaucrats, whether it was a
ruling party or an opposition party.”).
209
See, e.g., Velisarios Kattoulas, Corruption Scandals Rack Tokyo’s ‘Iron Triangle’: Struggle for
http://www.nytimes.com/1996/12/07/news/07ihtPower in Japan, N.Y. TIMES (Dec. 7, 1996),
scandal.t.html; Cameron W. Barr, Scandal Taints Japan’s Once Pristine Bureaucracy, THE CHRISTIAN SCI.
MONITOR, Dec. 13, 1996, http://www.csmonitor.com/1996/1213/121396.intl.intl.4.html.
210
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211
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STEVEN R. REED, JAPANESE PREFECTURES AND POLICYMAKING 27 (1986).
214
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central government’s authority. 215 Per Article 96 and Article 105 of the
Chinese Constitution, “local people’s congresses at various levels are local
organs of state power.” 216 The people’s congresses of provinces and
municipalities and their corresponding standing committees may adopt local
regulations after reporting such regulations to the Standing Committee of the
NPC for the record.217 The Constitution also grants local governors great
latitude in managing local affairs and implementing state policy. To contain
the influence of local administrators, the Chinese national government
forbids citizens from taking up positions of political leadership in their
region of origin and limits the term of provincial leaders to five years. In
contrast to the situation in Japan and China, the Singapore government does
not shoulder the costs associated with having their policy objectives
mediated or contradicted by the practices of local governing bodies. These
disparities are reflected in each county’s respective standing rules. In China,
the central government and the CCP are insulated from judicial review as a
matter of both law and practice—it is typically local administrators and
bureaucrats who are vulnerable. These currents are also at work in Japan
where the law has permitted certain forms of “public suits” against local
governments.218 Indeed, Ramseyer and Nakazato contend that the Japanese
courts have been complicit in diluting the discretion of local governors, most
of whom were not members of the long-ruling LDP.219 There is no such
dimension to Singapore administrative law.
V.

ALTERNATIVE MONITORING MECHANISMS

Nevertheless, there is at least one other decision problem faced by
political principals that is not adequately described by existing PPT models.
Though it has not been fully theorized in the existing work on comparative
215
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townships, and towns. The organization of local people’s congresses and local people’s governments at
various levels is prescribed by law. Organs of self-government are established in autonomous regions,
autonomous prefectures and autonomous counties.” XIANFA art. 95 (1982) (China), http://en.pkulaw.cn/dis
play.aspx?cgid=1457&lib=law.
216
Id. at art. 96 (“Local people's congresses at various levels are local organs of state power. Local
people's congresses at and above the county level establish standing committees.”); id. at art. 105 (“Local
people's governments at various levels are the executive bodies of local organs of state power as well as the
local organs of state administration at the corresponding levels.”).
217
Id. at art. 105 (“Governors, mayors and heads of counties, districts, townships and towns assume
overall responsibility for local people's governments at various levels.”).
218
See, e.g., John Marshall, Credible Commitments: Taxpayer Suits and Freedom of Information in
Japan, 16, (unpublished paper presented at the 2001 Annual Meeting of the American Political Science
Association), http://fs.huntingdon.edu/jlewis/FOIA/AsiaFOIA/MarshallJonAPSA01a.pdf.
219
RAMSEYER & NAKAZATO, supra note 36, at 217–18.

JANUARY 2016

EXPLAINING COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

125

administrative law, alternative monitoring mechanisms could substitute or
supplement judicial review.
In Japan, the administrative counseling system “provides the
opportunity for analyzing public complaints with a view towards improving
the performance of administrative agencies”—it is a “link in the chain of
administrative remedies available in Japan.” 220 The Administrative
Management Agency (AMA) was established in 1955 to receive public
complaints about national public administration agencies. Despite the
AMA’s apparent independence, its high status in the Japanese government
made it appear inaccessible to ordinary citizens. Therefore, in 1961, the
government appointed 882 local administrative councilors to be stationed
across the country. These councilors, though initially confined to relaying
grievances to the Administrative Inspection Bureau of the AMA, were
gradually permitted to participate in dispute resolution. For citizens, the
dual advantages of the Bureau’s administrative complaint investigations lie
in its scope—it could handle cases involving any act of administrative
agencies—and its speed. It is also procedurally less daunting than judicial
solutions. In addition to having bureaus in the major cities, the AMA
operates an exclusive hotline for members of the public to lodge complaints
against administrative agencies. As a result, the annual number of cases
filed with the AMA surged to almost 200,000 in the years preceding 1987.
In Singapore, the 1996 Wee Chong Jin Constitutional Commission
recommended the establishment of an ombudsman to handle complaints
against government agencies.221 Parliament, however, rejected this proposal,
preferring for disputes to be brought to the attention of MPs or the Feedback
Unit. The Meet the People Session (MPS) is an avenue for ordinary citizens
to appeal to their MPs for assistance. It is typically a weekly affair, held in
the evening for residents in a particular MP’s ward. 222 The complainant
describes his or her situation to a petition-writer, who prepares a statement to
be presented to the MP. The MP then hears the grievance in person before
signing off on the drafted letter and delivering it to the relevant ministry or
statutory boards. 223 Although civil servants are obliged to respond to
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correspondence from MPs, they do not have to revise their initial policy or
make an exception, and it is not unusual for a petition to be denied.
In China, the central government relies on “letters and visits,” or
xinfang, to collect public feedback and identify corrupt or disobedient local
officials.224 The xinfang process in China was originally established in 1951
pursuant to “The Decision of State Council Referring to Receive Letters and
Visits of People.”225 It serves “as an alternative to formal legal channels for
many citizens seeking to resolve their grievances.”226 Xinfang offices accept
complaints, proposals, and opinions raised by citizens through letters, emails, telephone calls, or personal visits.227 The significance of xinfang is
reflected in the numbers.228 From 1992 to 2004, the total amount of xinfang
petitions in China increased by more than ten percent each year, reaching a
peak of 13,736,000 in 2004.229 10,336,000 xinfang petitions were filed in
2009.230
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There are a number of reasons why Chinese citizens resort to xinfang
for administrative disputes. First, judicial review is unreliable. Yu Jianrong,
a law professor at Peking University, interviewed 632 xinfang rural
petitioners filing complaints in Beijing in 2004. Of these petitioners, 401
had previously tried to pursue legal avenues for redress. Of the 401
petitioners, 172 did not manage to obtain a judicial hearing, 220 were
unjustly denied relief, and nine were seeking to have favorable judicial
decisions enforced.231 Furthermore, in contrast to the standing requirements
for administrative litigation, xinfang bureaus receive a broad range of
petitions, including those not based on legal arguments. The administrative
acts challenged through xinfang do not need to implicate the petitioners’
personal and property rights. For example, the Discipline Inspection Bureau
of Hunan reported that the complaints about “unfair and offensive conduct”
made up twenty-five percent of all xinfang petitions in Hunan between 1995
and 1998. 232 In addition, the remedies available through xinfang are
perceived to be effective when granted. This is because state and local
agencies are more likely to follow the directions of their superiors in the
governmental hierarchy than to obey a court order.233
However, petitioners visiting xinfang bureaus risk being physically
intercepted by agents of local authorities, a phenomenon known as
jiefang.234 This tactic, justified by the purported need to suppress potential
“mass incidents” and the political strategy of “buying stability,” has
restricted the access of aggrieved citizens to xinfang and prevented petitions
from being heard by higher-level administrators. 235 Under the cover of
“maintaining stability,” jiefang has impeded petitioners attempting to contact
the state xinfang bureau or even the government at the next level.236 For
231
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example, according to an investigation of several provinces in 2006,
including Henan, Liaoning and Shandong, some grassroots organizations,
and even local xinfang offices that did not fulfill their responsibilities to
resolve petitions, spent a substantial amount of funds on arranging the
interception of state xinfang petitioners.237 Even though the Chinese central
government has managed to constrain jiefang238 and a few perpetrators of
jiefang were punished by courts,239 some local governors are still willing to
risk punishment to avoid a blemish on their reputations that may cost them
an opportunity for promotion.240
These examples demonstrate that courts are not the only means for
principals to obtain information on the activity of their agents. Alternatives
such as administrative counseling, MPS, or xinfang may be used in lieu of
judicial review. The availability of multiple channels of supervision thus
raises some interesting questions for PPT. In particular, non-judicial
mechanisms and administrative law are not perfect substitutes. First, the
quality and quantity of information collected differs. For instance, because
lawsuits are generally expensive and time-consuming, they tend to involve
administrative actions that have a significant financial, emotional, or
symbolic impact on the complainant. In contrast, grievances filed under a
less formal process might range from trivial to serious. Second, judicial
resolution of an administrative dispute is public and could create precedent
in common law jurisdictions. If the principal prefers fluid results to the
Thesis) (on file with author), http://cdmd.cnki.com.cn/Article/CDMD-10423-1012504717.htm; Hou Meng,
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creation of legal rules, he or she should avoid excessive reliance on legal
institutions.
Figure 6

Third, it is less politically costly to change the outcome of a more
informal or bureaucratic style of adjudication than it is to change judicial
dispositions. This is because ignoring or reversing a court decision risks
undermining the stability provided by the larger judicial system. Finally,
non-judicial actors typically do not enjoy the same institutional protections
as judges and are vulnerable to capture by the agents being supervised241 or
by an incoming political administration.242 Thus, principals should continue
to rely on courts if bureaucrats are influential or if they expect a turn in the
political tides.
VI.

CONCLUSION

The recent literature has attempted to assess the plausibility of a PPT
account of administrative law by applying and evaluating it in a comparative
setting. Magill and Ortiz argue that a basic prediction of PPT (presidential
systems ought to rely more heavily on judicial review) is contradicted by
their findings about reasonable review doctrines in United States, the United
Kingdom, France, and Germany. On the other hand, Garoupa and Mathews
try to reconcile PPT with a number of case studies by introducing an
241
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jiefang.
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additional element into the analysis: the principal-agent relationship between
the legislature and the judiciary.
This article compares the class of plaintiffs entitled to seek judicial
review of administrative action in three party-dominated countries, Japan,
Singapore, and China. These countries share similar cultural attitudes
towards the use of law and have low-autonomy courts. From a cursory
examination of each country’s respective codes and case law, it is fair to
conclude that before 2014, standing requirements were more stringent in
China than in Japan. Singapore is a common law jurisdiction that considers
questions of locus standi using the substantial interest test. In particular, the
two-stage test articulated by R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners ex p
National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd. and
seemingly accepted by Singapore courts necessitates a balancing between
the merits of the case and the degree of a plaintiff’s concern. This wrinkle
makes any rough comparison between Singapore and the other two
jurisdictions contestable and highly subjective. Looking across time,
however, it is clear that the class of eligible plaintiffs has expanded in Japan,
particularly over the last decade. In China, there had been intense discussion
about the liberalization of standing that culminated in the 2014 amendments.
There are still no signs of any pronounced push for relaxed standing rules in
Singapore.
Table 5
Japan
China
Singapore

Local Governments
Yes
Yes
No

Political Turnover
Yes
No
No

The analysis suggests that some of these differences are adequately
captured by the political economy approach to administrative law. First, the
LDP is factionalized and has experienced strong inter-party political
competition since 1993, whereas the PAP and the CCP have comfortably
retained power until today. The dilution of political power allows the
judiciary more space to maneuver and increases the demand for insurance.
Second, the national government in Japan, as well as China, has to govern
through local authorities. The friction and devolution of power generates
agency costs that courts could help mitigate.

JANUARY 2016

EXPLAINING COMPARATIVE ADMINISTRATIVE LAW

131

The takeaway is that three factors may be relevant to a PPT account of
comparative administrative law. First, local governments, in addition to
administrative agencies, are sometimes also agents of the national
government.243 As such, administrative law can help principals regulate the
acts of local governments and those of agencies. Second, political turnover
may influence the shape of administrative law. For example, incumbent
legislators may support judicial review if they know they might be out of
power sometime in the future. The availability of courts as a forum for
contesting administrative actions is useful for political interests that are not
fully represented by the legislatures or executives. Third is the possibility of
using monitoring mechanisms other than judicial review. The former and
the latter are not perfect substitutes. Hence, the decision to rely on a nonjudicial agent, a court, or both, depends on the transaction costs of
overriding a judicial decision, the quantity and quality of information desired,
and, once again, political turnover. If there is political turnover, judicial
review by independent courts might be favored over other mechanisms that
are controlled by the executives or legislatures.
In conclusion, some of the differences in standing doctrine observed
between Japan, China, and Singapore are adequately captured by the PPT
approach to administrative law. However, there is a possibility that the
theory might not always generate clear predictions for comparative
administrative law. This is because the availability of non-judicial
mechanisms for monitoring agent conduct introduces a new dimension into
the analysis that has not been taken in account by Magill and Ortiz or
Garoupa and Mathews. PPT must be supplemented by research into the
choice of monitoring agents and the allocation of power between them.
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